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LAE: It's July 29th, 1998, and I'm Lynda Ann Ewen with the Oral History of Appalachia 
Program at Marshall University. And I'm interviewing John Taylor and David Greene, 
and the general subject is the anti-injunction strikes of the mid-1970's. Could I ask 
each of you to give your name? And I'm going to ask you to indicate your agreement 
that these interviews be made part of the Special Collections of the library at Marshall 
University. 
JT: My name is John Taylor, and yes, I agree, that this whatever product of this 
DG: My name is David Greene and I agree, also. 
LAE: John, would you tell us a little bit about yourself, why you were involved and what 
was your relationship to the United Mine Workers at-the time of the strikes? 
JT: I came to Charleston, West Virginia in March of 1975 from Detroit. And I was hired 
by District 17 UMWA, specifically to do legal work defending the wild cat strikes that 
were prevalent in southern West Virginia at that time. 
LAE: David? 
DG: I came to West Virginia in 1967 as part of the VISTA program, and was involved in 
a lot of community and community organizing and political education efforts during the 
'60's and '?O's. And in 197 4, -5, and -6, was involved with the United Mine Workers in 
different ways, and '77 as well, working in the mines for a year in '75 and working with 
the UMW in different ways around that time. 
LAE: Let me begin with the Buffalo Creek Flood . Which occurred in .... 
JT: February of 1972. 
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LAE: And because-, John, could you tell us a little bit about what you believe to be the 
connections between the Buffalo Creek flood and the beginnings of some of the 
wildcats? 
JT: Yeah, that connection didn't become explicit to me until I had a conversation with 
Sim Howze, who was the president of Local 8054, Laredo, West Virginia, in the spring, 
or late spring, early summer of 1975. There was a strike at that mine, at the strip 
mines, and it was a rather mundane dispute about job bidding on who would drive what 
to cause a lot of anger and bitterness. And the miners at the local said they just 
absolutely would not go back until this man was put on a truck that he wanted. And I 
asked Sim Howze why, why were the the miners so adamant about this issue. And he 
said, "Well, it's part-, it all stemmed from the flood . And they wanted to get back at 
Pittston, they wanted to get back at Pittston and they decided that they would do that. 
They, there was bitterness in the community, and they, they wanted to get back at 
them. 
LAE: Would you describe your perceptions of that Buffalo Creek local, in terms of 
racial composition? 
JT: Well, it was almost entirely white. But the president, Sim Howze, who'd been 
president for a long time, was black, African American. As time went by, I have 
discovered that on Buffalo Creek there were a number of African American individuals 
who were very influential in the affairs of the union and the community. One that I met 
early on, and was introduced to me by Jack Perry, who's president of District 17, was a 
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fellow named Early Jones. And Early Thomas, Early Thomas . And you know, they-, 
Jack Perry told me that they, he took me and introduced me to Early Thomas and told 
me how much he respected this man. 
LAE: In this particular dispute over the truck driver, was the truck driver white or black? 
JT: Yes, he was white . 
LAE: Okay. David, would you share with us some of your perceptions of the aftermath 
of the Buffalo Creek flood in terms of people's anger and consciousness? 
Buffalo Creek, though. I think Buffalo Creek probably brought out some strong feelings 
and relationships . I mean, there's such a long history of the coal company's abuse and 
exploitation of both the miners and the families, the communities, the disregard for life, 
and at the, to the benefit of making lots of money off the coal. A lot of resentment for-, 
about coal company land that was taxed at a lower level, uh, properties, a lot of 
resentment about the fact that coal companies, people would sit by all the time and see 
coal go out of the community on the coal train, sometimes 500-cars long, and have lots 
of unemployment, or have employment that cost people their lives, employment that 
resulted in Black Lung and injury, and employment, or lack of employment. So, there's 
a lot of sense of outrage that sort of seems to me that seethes underneath the surface 
about what the coal companies represent. And the coal-, it's so glaring in Appalachia 
and West Virginia because it's such a major extractive industry. So there's, there's 
some of that I think that's real important for anybody to know about, that that's there. 
think Buffalo Creek where a hundred and hundred and how many people? 
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JT: A hundred and twenty-five. 
DG: A hundred twenty-five people lost their lives. People just almost rose up 
spontaneously. And while the newspapers and radios were filled with a bunch of stuff 
saying this was an act of God and this was, you know, we shouldn't criticize Pittston, 
say anything about what happened. Uh, people were just, you know, could hardly 
believe it, even though they knew, knew the things coal companies were doing . 
JT: Let, let me pick up the thread that he just mentioned, and focus on a particular 
grievance procedure. Because the, the anti-injunction strike, as we call it, occurred in 
June of 1976. The strike, the job bidding strike that I mentioned occurred in the spring 
of 1975. And when I, when I came down to Detroit in March of 1975, I was ... l was 
amazed at the frequency of Wildcat strikes. Because our law firm-, I had been fired in a 
Wildcat strike at Chrysler, axel plant in May of 1970. And then I was in private practice, 
and our firm had defended several Wildcat strikes in the auto industry in the Detroit 
area . In fact, we became known for doing that. But I wasn't ready for 3 or 4 strikes in 
the morning, and a couple, three more in the afternoon, maybe some more on 
midnights. I mean, I was in the injunction court in Charleston, at the Federal 
courthouse in Charleston, just all the time. And there was a, a breakdown of the 
grievance procedure. In fact, one of the first cases I did, like in May, April or May of 
1975, was an attempt by the Kanawha Coal Operators Association, to get an injunction 
against the mines ... well, the mines that comprised the Kanawha Coal Operators 
Association, members of the Carbon Fuel Company and Imperial Colliery and 
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Bethlehem Mines, Valley Camp Coal Company and you know, those-, those 
companies . And when I talked to the union field reps, for that in the Kanawha sub-
district, they said that the Kanawha coal operators personnel and Jackson and Kelly, 
their lawyer, were deliberately refusing to settle grievances at the first and second and 
even third steps, and forcing everything to arbitration. Because the coal association 
field reps got paid more, the more cases they arbitrated. And we, we proved that in a 
court of law, before Judge K.K. Holmes, tough judge. He refused their injunction, said 
Creek. So there was, there was like an atmosphere where the coal company was just 
absolutely not going to cooperate. And then, on top of that, there was the aftermath of 
the bitterness of the flood and the other factors that David has mentioned. David didn't 
mention the gasoline strike of 197 4 (DG: That's right) These people would strike uh, 
you know, the gasoline strike of '74 was over the policy of rationing gasoline and the 
miners couldn 't get enough fuel, gasoline for their cars to get to work because a lot of 
'em had to drive long distances just to get out and do their shifts. So this is like a 
continuum. And then, like we say, we .. . we beat back the Kanawha operators, and this 
other thing jumped off down in Buffalo Creek. 
LAE: And what was, if there was, the connection between the Buffalo Creek strike and 
the building of the continuation of the Wildcat movement to the injunction strike? 
JT: Okay, good, good question. Well, the coal companies throughout, well, in District 
17 and District 29, which is down in Beckley ... 
LA E: Would you briefly tell us what comprised District 17? 
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JT: All right, District 17 basically was from Clay County down to the northern part of 
Wyoming County and then to the state line. And then District 29 was everything south 
of that line, Wyoming County down to McDowell County and Raleigh County. You 
know, there's a lot of people down there. And in fact, when I hired on in District 17, I 
had 25,000 working and District 29 had about 15,000 working. And this is not even 
saying anything about District 31 in Northern West Virginia, or District 6 up in the 
Northern Panhandle and Ohio. There was, I mean, I just say that to bring out that 
LAE: Back to my question . Do you remember the question? (JT: No) A connection 
between the Buffalo Creek strike and .. .. 
JT: Oh, sure . The ... the coal companies continued to abuse the uh, process, the 
grievance process . They continued to run to the court for injunctions against strikes, 
rather than trying to implement procedure and settle disputes at the mine site, which is 
what they were supposed to do. And they would, they were just promiscuous with-, and 
they would go-, and the judges were promiscuous in granting the injunctions. Judge 
Knapp and to a lesser extent, Judge-, Judge Hall was relatively new, but Judge Knapp 
was just, he was easy, he was easy. And the coal companies .... 
LAE: Easy for whom? 
JT: For the coal companies. And the uh, the law firms that represented these people, 
made plenty of money. Jackson and Kelly-, of course, we didn't have computers then, 
but they had typewriters that had what was called a Mag Card in it, which was like a 
canned complaint for an injunction. So they can crank out a complaint for an injunction 
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and a temporary restraining order in like a half hour or so, and make-, I don't know, 
someone told me they made like $1 500 per case just for doing that. Just like 15 
minutes work for some employee . And they would run over to Judge Knapp and then 
they would say, they would call me. They would call me and they'd say, "There's a 
strike at Valley Camp on this first shift, and the issue's safety or job bidding or 
whatever. And court. 
LA E: For people that don't understand, would you go just briefly what the process 
JT: All right. The grievance procedure had four steps. The first step was a meeting 
between the miner and his immediate supervisor. The second step was a meeting 
between the mine, mine committee and local mine management. The third step you 
would get field reps from the union and represent-, you know, Kanawha Coal Operators 
Association reps, Logan Operators Association, or Mingo Operators Association . And 
fourth step was supposed to be arbitration . And labor law at that time said that you 
cannot, the union could not strike over anything that was arbitratable. And the union, 
the contract. .. defined ... the scope of the arbitration clause became very large in the 
1978 contract, and included local trouble of any kind. But before that, it technically, 
pickets, pickets were not supposed to be arbitratable. Therefore, it would be injunction 
proof. But that's a whole legal complex piece of legal history that we don't need to go 
into. But anyway, that's a sketch of what the procedure was-, how it was supposed to 
operate, but didn't. 
DG: I think that also between 1972 and '76, '77, that uhm, let me step back. I don't 
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know who this exactly, who's gonna exactly hear this. But I think people should know 
real clearly that working in the mines is extremely hazardous, under the best of 
conditions, under the most safe, most well-mechanized, you know, it's very dangerous, 
tremendously dangerous . And more dangerous for new people, but still really 
dangerous. And not just the hazards of Black Lung, but equipment, explosions, fast 
moving cables, air, questions, sides, roofs, you know, of the mines . And all this stuff is 
really, sort of has laid the context of some of this stuff. And I think right, as the 
with procedures in the mines that risk lives. (JT: Right, right) And so I, in working in 
1975 and talking to a lot of people over the years, I know this is true . I worked for 
Bethlehem, Bethlehem Steel, Bethlehem Mines Corporation in '75, and Bethlehem was 
relatively safe compared to some other companies . They still flaunted the safety rules . 
And they still told people to go out in unsupported top and all this kind of stuff where it 
was dangerous. And so, miners uh, based on all kinds of things, sharpened their 
willingness to say, "Hell with this. I'm not, we're not working today." And I think that 
even though the companies portrayed this bunch of stuff as deer hunting holidays, you 
know, they said the miners just want more deer hunting [inaudible].... That's why 
they're going out, you know, quitting work today, or closing down the mines, striking. 
That in reality, there, there were a tremendous amount, tremendous number of 
incidents where people were being pushed to do unsafe stuff. And sometimes they did 
it, and sometimes people walked out. And so there was all these instances all over the 
coal fields. And I went to work in that one year of 1975, there were twenty wildcats that 
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affected the place I worked. And probably more. It wasn't that militant of a local. But 
people would show up-, four guys would show up at the mouth of a hollow or 
somewhere, and say, "We're not working today." You know. And it would be based on, 
and at first, you don't even necessarily find out what's going on right away. But a day 
or two later, or later in the day, I do know that somebody did something, you know, 
some Carbon Fuel or somebody pushed past a certain point. (JT: Yeah, right) 
LAE: Could you just briefly talk about pickets and the process of people from one mine 
• I 1 • fl - ,-... r ,-.,. I I -p:cKet:n~ ano1ner r une er your Jonn r 
JT: Well, it's just ... ! grew up in a coal mining family . It's just an article of faith that you 
not, that you do not cross the picket line. And if you cross the picket line, you will be 
punished. There were people who would cross pick(3t lines and come back and find 
their car windshields all smashed, or you, they would cross the picket lines and work 
and come out in their clothes and so forth , and the bathhouse would be trashed. Or 
instances where people that crossed picket lines they would get beat up. I mean, you 
just don't cross a picket line. And they took very serious 
there's an oath that mine workers take, publically, at the local hall when they are 
initiated. It says, "I will not wrong a brother, nor will I see him wronged." You see? And 
they took that very seriously, which is correct, they should do that. And .... 
LAE: Why, why would men from one mine picket another company's mine? 
JT: Because their brothers were being wronged. They just took it on faith . If a brother 
said, "There's something bad here, we ain't working, you ain't working, either," and that 
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was it. 
DG: And there was a sense that the more, just truly, the more that you could shut down, 
the more strength you would have in dealing with coal companies. And sometimes not 
even the same company. But you could put pressure on one to put pressure on 
another. But they were, people were moved around, advanced, at certain, at different 
times during that period. And shut down a number of mines, or talked to fellow workers, 
other miners in those miners, and they'd say, "We're with you, brother." And they'd say, 
spread effect. 
JT: Let's not forget these coal operators had associations. They acted organized, 
associative way. And why shouldn't the local union-; the local union doesn 't stand by 
itself. It's part of the union, just like the associa-, coal association is. 
LAE: You mentioned, David, at the time the picket line showed up, men may not know 
why it was there, but that you asserted within a day or two, people would generally find 
out. Was that true? I mean, that people did find out what this was about. 
DG: Yeah, yeah, sure, I think there's a really good communication system that's not 
formalized, too, in the coalfield communities. Where, and it's probably a historical 
development that I'm not clear on . But uh, I know that people would communicate. 
You'd show up and I'd show up for work, and there'd be four guys there, you know, or 
six guys and they'd be some of the guys from the mine as well. And nobody would 
cross the picket line. (JT: Right) Nobody would go to work. They'd say, "All right," you 
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know. And they'd sometimes ask what's going on , and sometimes the picketers were 
not as clear about the specifics. But still the origin in most of the cases that I knew, not 
every one, the origins of the strike was something very substantive, very having to do 
with life and health and safety. 
JT: Let, let me give some specific examples and causes .. . 
LAE: Can I ask one question, did the men then lose wages for the time they honored 
the line? 
IT· Voe r,f f"f'\I 1rco tho11 lr,ct IAl-:>l"loc, 
~• I --! -• __ .._.., -- t.1 •-: •'--'-'- If~ ......._:::;:i ..... .._,,,, 
the union leadership explained it to me. And that is that the coal companies had 
penalty clauses in their contracts . If they didn 't produce a certain amount of coal in a 
certain time , they got penalized under contract. And-remember this was the year of the 
Iranian, you know, the OPEC gasoline embargo, and they really needed the coal. I 
mean, the miners understood this very clearly and what was explained to me was, it's 
all right because they'll have to work us overtime, and we'll make it up anyway. 
LAE: Now, what were you going to go ahead and say? 
JT: I was just going to give some examples of some strikes that are sort of outstanding 
in my mind for the causes. I remember one at Valley Camp. No, at Union Carbide. 
Blue Creek, Sanderson, where there was a violation of some safety procedure, under 
the Mine, Health and Safety Act, which came in the 1970's. It was supposed to be 
protected. The safety committee man ordered a withdrawal. And he was punished by 
being forced to work in a water hole under ground. I remember that one clearly. And, 
and, and they struck over that one. We held them off for quite a while . And that was, 
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and I remember one up at Riverton Coal Company up in Powellton Hollow, where the 
men came out to work, and went out in the mines and was supposed to be supplied 
with water. You know, little jugs of water? The water was slimy and green. You 
know ... it was just ... that same coal company, Mr. McQuaid was-, Joe McQuaid was this 
fool that ran the mines. They didn't, they didn't have water for the bathhouse one time. 
He pumped, they pumped water from Armstrong Creek, which is like an open sewer 
into the, into the bathhouse and have the men bathing in that. Then they found out, 
firemen knew some of the miners and said, you know, "This water's from Armstrong 
Creek. You better not bathe in it." I mean, that's the sort of thing that would, you know, 
that would, that would cause strikes, and it should have caused strikes. It should have. 
They were absolutely correct to strike at the mine. 
LAE: But as I understand it, they were striking because if they tried to raise it as a 
grievance, nobody would listen. Is that right? 
DG: Well, yeah, you'd file a grievance and there'd be intolerable delays. Even after the 
case .. . 
LAE: You haven't, you haven't spoken to that. Would you explain that? 
JT: Okay, even if they would file grievances, nothing would happen n. Even, even not 
withstanding the case I described earlier, about the Kanawha Coal Operators, it just 
continued. The grievance procedure just didn't work. It just didn't work. 
DG: And, the uh, just in line with exactly what John is saying, if you've got an unsafe 
condition or if you've got something that's endangering people's lives, and you file a 
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grievance, you have to wait for a procedure to happen, a legal procedure, where people 
meet, they have a certain number of days they can take. And you have to deal with 
that unsafe condition, as long as the procedure is not, doesn't say "We remedy the 
problem until the grievance procedure." It says, "We wait till the end of the grievance 
process and then we see if we correct this thing or not." So people, you know, people 
were not having that. 
LAE: So, would you argue that Buffalo Creek and then the Buffalo Creek strike was sort 
JT: It was an outstanding step of a sequence. (LAE: Okay) Because we haven't gotten 
into the details, you know, what happened in that strike and what happened to Sim 
Howze and the local. But. .. . 
DG: I just want to ... l, I, I think they were important points. But I think it's really important 
to recognize the development of things. And so, this is a developing relationship, a 
developing conflict between labor and the coal companies. (JT: Yes) Historically 
developing a lot longer than this. (JT: That's right) But seething at a certain point. And 
also, uh, you know, responding to other things that are going on, in the [inaudible] ... 
country. As John said, the oil embargo, the whole, the question of.... There were other 
major strikes in this country in the '?O's by other labor... (JT: Sure) The Dodge strike in 
'7 4 and lots of other .... 
JT: Yeah, I was fired in one of the major strikes. 
DG: And so, I think these things were, everybody didn't know everything that was going 
on. But they knew pieces and they knew what this climate was about. And there was 
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definitely a climate to uh, keep labor to control labor, you know. And the miners felt, 
they might have not known or understood all the details. But they knew knew what 
was happening . And they could feel-, you could feel it at work. 
JT: See, and then also, this was Vietnam Era. And a number of the miners in the work 
force were returned Vietnam veterans during this period of time. They weren't taking 
any shit. And also, this is the period post miners for democracy and Arnold Miller, and 
the miners were proud . (DG: that's right) and they knew, 
DG: That's right. And expectations were high about what should be the result (JT: 
That's rights) of this democracy. 
JT: That's right, that's exactly right. 
LAE: And you would say ... and I hear you arguing that the average miner had a sense 
of this, even though, you know, it may not have been fully detailed . 
JT: Let me .. .. l worked in the car plants, and was active in the union and so forth . And 
you had to struggle with the United Mine Workers to get a copy of the contract. One of 
the things that stands out, stood out to me down here was that the miners were very 
well educated . They carried the contract around in their pockets. 
LAE: I think you mis-spoke. Did you mean you had to struggle to get a copy of the 
United Auto Workers contract? 
JT: Yeah, it was hard to get it. 
LAE: And the miners here carried the contract? 
JT: Yeah, they gave, when they ratified the contracts, everybody got a copy, you know, 
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and they'd carry them around. It was amazing. They knew the contract. A lot of them 
educated me when I first got down there. 
LAE: So this is not a sort of passive, uneducated .. . 
JT: Oh, they were a sophisticated bunch of people. 
DG: Yeah. Now, I don't think miners did not understand a bunch of stuff they needed to 
understand or we all need to understand about what's, what the economics are of the 
situation and what the coal operators are doing behind closed doors, and how they're 
understood how, how they were being treated and how the contract was being 
circumvented and how when they went to work, they were under the control of the 
companies. And that-, you could feel that. And you-could feel it more then because 
there was an expectation that "Why should we put up with this?" 
LAE: Okay. So, we've discussed a series of Wildcats, and I want to take you back. 
You said there was some special implications in an ending to the Buffalo Creek Strike 
(JT: Yeah) and I would like you to tell that story, please. 
JT: Okay. Well. .. Judge Hall, K.K. Hall, who's very rigid on the law. And shortly before 
we came to court with the Buffalo Creek strike, there had been another strike. And I 
have the transcript where Judge Hall complained to the lawyer for the Logan Operators 
Association, Joe Bob Goodman-who's now a federal judge in Huntington-about the coal 
companies conducting labor relations in his court. Explicitly said he was tired of the 
companies coming in for their morning order. And he was just going to start bucking on 
it. And then, then the Buffalo Creek strike started and there was an injunction, and of 
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course, they didn't go back. And there was a dispute about whether .. 
LAE: You mean the miners didn't. .. 
JT: The miners didn't go back to Buffalo Creek. There was an injunction and they 
defied the injunction. They said there's pickets , there were pickets from other mines . 
And they were afraid, they were afraid of to cross the line. And uh, they were ... . 
END SIDE 1 - BEGIN SIDE 2 
LAE: Would you please repeat the last sentence that we lost on the tape? 
jT: Yes, we were in court before K. K. Haii on the motion that Pittston Coai Company for 
a rule to show cause why that local should not be found in contempt of Judge Hall's 
temporary restraining order and injunction. And there was a dispute about whether or 
not the local union and the district union had, you kn-ow, gathered full efforts to get the 
people back to work. And there was a dispute about what Sim Howze had said or had 
not said . So, they, they put Vernon Cornett was the superintendent, they put him on 
the stand. And I cross-examined him and tried to minimize his testimony. But he said, 
"Sim, Sim had said the men aren't going back to work. And I won't make them go 
back," words to that effect. And then, they put Sim Howze on the stand. And he's, he 
was very intelligent and he answered the questions very intelligently, then he was 
basically run in circles around Joe Bob Goodwin. But then Judge Hall started, and 
Judge Hall being Judge Hall, came right to the point and said, "Did you tell your men to 
cross the picket line? That's what you should have done." And he said, "No, we don't 
do that. I, I will never tell my men to cross the picket. You know ... that would not. ... " 
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he says, "I have to be honest with the court," he says, "I will not cross picket lines and I 
will not tell my local members to cross the picket line." And Judge Hall said, "Well, you 
couldn't, Mr. Howze, you could not be in more contempt of my order." [DG chuckles] 
And then he asked, "Are you going to go back and tell your people to cross the picket 
lines?" He said, "No, I won't." So, at that point, he put him in-, they called the marshals 
in and took him up to the holding cell and took him down to the Cabell County jail down 
in Huntington. 
JT: I think they wanted to isolate him, make it hard for him to be a focal point of activity, 
coal miners. But it didn't work because I mean, within one shift, all of Logan, all this 
side of Logan County and so forth, was out. I mean,- everybody knew about it. It was in 
the newspapers. People knew about it. And they just started picketing , roving pickets 
then. Everything was out, one shift down there. And in 24 hours, every mine. Every 
mine in District 17. And I can't remember whether District 29 was. But they were all 
out, all of them. And they stayed out for I think, 13 days or something. 
LA E: What is a roving picket? 
JT: Well, it's the sort of thing David was describing where people get organized, they're 
highly organized. And, and uh, go for-, they know where the 
are, they know where the hollows are, and the mines are, and they just-, they know. 
And they go and say, "Sorry, buddy, there's no work here today." Sim Howze is in jail 
and you know ... nobody works. 
LAE: So how long was Sim Howze in jail? 
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JT: I can't remember whether it was 10 days or 13 days, I just can't remember. But 
eventually, there was some-, we worked out some sort of a face-saving arrangement. 
can't remember the details. I do remember that Jim Haviland, who was the 
international union lawyer, and I, as the District 17 lawyer, were called to a secret, 
confidential meeting that Arch Moore, the governor of the State of West Virginia . They 
took us, it was on a Saturday, I think, or Saturday afternoon, or Sunday. There was 
nobody around the state capitol. And they took us ... at that time, under the-, the big 
you go around the bottom, there 's a driveway. And at that time, there was an obscure 
little door there underneath those stairs. And if you went through that, there was an 
elaborate office in there. And that's where we met Arch Moore. He was talking in his 
usual bullshit way, trying to figure out how we-, what the union could do to get the 
people back to work because they'd been out for a week, and everything was shut 
down. In fact, he gave me, he gave us both cuff links, gold cuff links and tie clips . I 
kept them for years, but I finally got rid of them. But you know, we told him there's 
nothing we could do. What can we do? 
LAE: It's my understanding that there was a large demonstration on behalf of Sim. 
JT: I understand that. I have, I don't specifically recall. I understand that within the city 
of Charleston there was, the miner's marched. You know, I can't remember who led it 
or how it happened. But there was a lot of miners in the streets of Charleston. And I, I 
understand, I heard that the city of Charleston ordered the fire fighters to come out and 
turn the hoses on these people and the fire fighters wouldn't do it. 
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LAE: Do you know, do you remember. ... 
DG: Yeah, I marched with actually with Joshua, my son, in that thing. He was on my 
back. Because he was three, I think, somewhere around three. And I think there were 
about 400-, 400 miners there. I mean, that's my remembrance of this thing. And uh, 
that it was not, there was no permit. It was just a march down the street. They was-, 
they weren't stopped. 
LAE: Which street? 
LAE: Go ahead . 
JT: I remember now. It was, it was uh, down, I think they came down Virginia Street 
and then turned up Capitol Street ... ! think. Because-we were told not to go anywhere 
near it. But we had an intern, a legal intern that year, Amy Totenberg, who's sister, 
Nina, is now legal affairs correspondent for National Public Radio. I don't know what 
happened to Amy. But I had a lot of experience with stuff in the Vietnam protest 
marches . And I told her how we used to put various phone numbers on our hands, you 
know, for legal support and to carry lots of dimes, so you could make calls. Which she-, 
they'd never had-, they had no experience whatsoever in these kinds of things. They 
didn't know how to do legal defense. In Detroit, we would even have writs and habeas 
corpus all written, just fill in the blanks, run it to court, bail people out, you know. They 
weren't-, we weren't ready to do that at that time. (LAE: But as .. . ) I remember that 
now. We were told to stay away. 
DG: There were, during 1976 and part of 1975, there were a series of strikes that were 
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much more than local mine strikes. (LA: Excuse me, I need to ... ) [tape off/on] There 
were a lot of things that were going on. One is that there were, I mean, the anti-
injunction strike came at the end of a whole series of injunctions and temporary 
restraining orders (JT: Yeah, yeah). And so, there were a number of strikes, some of 
which were led by the Right-To-Strike committee. And that were, that involved shutting 
down a lots, a bunch of mines. I'm not sure of the exact numbers. I remember two or 
three different times when uh, miners and the Right-To-Strike committee and Right-To-
StrikA r,ommittAe W8S m::irlP. 1m of somA oolitir.8llv ;:ir,tivP. minArs who were sort of IAftist 
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miners. But also, a whole number of people who fust joined force because they were 
outraged at the injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Every time miners would 
try and strike over something, a restraining order would come out so they couldn't 
strike. And, and so this stuff was building. And so there were, there were several fairly 
big strikes. And I remember in uh, not as big as the anti-injunction strike. But, but I 
remember one in Local 750, which is where I was, which was Arnold Miller's old local, 
where people handled out leaflets, to try and get people .... It was more, more 
information about the coal companies and all this stuff, and this political literature. But it 
was uh, the local was divided about it, because it was ahead of time. It was sort of like 
they were giving out leaflets. It wasn't really pickets showing up. It was somebody 
handing out leaflets saying here's what the coal companies are doing, you know, we 
need to stop this . Next Tuesday we're gonna do this. So, there was enough time for 
the conservative section of the local to get in business, get active and start to say, "We 
don't want these people coming here and shutting down our mines." You know, "we're 
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good workers, we work all the time." And there was this dynamic that went on. And I 
uh, I know that one of the things that the roving pickets did that uh, couldn't be 
responded to as well, was they showed up and had a picket line. And it was done. And 
then the mine was gonna close down. If you, if you tried to get a local to strike ahead of 
time, you allow the opposition to start to organize. And that happens some. You 
know? But there were some big strikes and big rallies. I remember one at Drawdy 
Falls , that I went to, where there was several speakers, something like the Right-
To-Strike committee and some who, who were bringing up their own safety violations in 
the mines. But there were hundreds and hundreds of miners there. Not just a few (JT: 
Yeah) . And the leadership wasn't very clear and very good about all that stuff. But it 
was, it was sort of a pre-practice almost. So when Buffalo went out, you know, people 
were .. . a lot of people were really ready for someth ing . 
JT: Let me, let me raise another point about Drawdy Falls. That was a popular place, 
because, because it was like, it was on Route 10, and it wasn't too far from the 
Kanawha Countij border, just inside Boone County, central place for Kanawha and 
Boone County. And it was like an amphitheater. 
The stream, the Raleigh Creek came around like in a half circle . And the park was in 
that half circle, and the ground would rise. So somebody would get up like on a little hill 
and speak out and there was like cliffs and so forth, a rock cliff back up against the 
stream. So it was like a natural amphitheater. And they would meet there. 
DG: And they had something else. Just (JT: Everybody knew about it) in terms of 
democracy and participation, even though those things were not well led and were led 
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to the point of falling down, uh, they were, people participated in all kinds of ways. I 
mean, they would be like I said, there would be hundreds of miners come from as far as 
Mingo, Mercer, Logan , other districts, you know, sometimes would come up to 
Drawdy, certainly Kanawha County, Boone County. And they'd come there, they'd hear 
some speakers, they cheered, sometimes they'd walk away, sometimes they'd get up 
and start to yell from the audience, that it was really involved . And it was a good thing. 
LAE: I want to go back to the point you made about the conservative sector of the 
minPr~ rnr.; • Vpi:;) RPr.::i1,~P , in tn thii:; nnint it lnnk~ likP P\/Pr\/hnrl" i~ ::ill , 1nitPrl rnr.; • · ···· · - -- , - - · . -- , - -------- -- ,- -- -· · · - ,- - -··•, · - ·-- -·- •·· ·- - - - -.,-- ---., ·- - · · · -· ··· --- - ,- - -
Yeah) And could you maybe identify what you think were the points of difference 
between miners? I mean, it seems to me like safety, everybody would be agreed on it. 
So, how was it the conservative proposed the issue to keep people from striking, or 
how would they make their arguments? 
DG: Well, there were, there were different people who bought into the stuff about the 
coal companies being their friends, you know. When I first went to work in the mines, 
and I, you know, you have to use dust collectors you're supposed to wear to uh, 
indicate whether or not there's dust in the air you worked, see if you were gonna get 
black lung and die from it. So, when I went to work in the mines, Bethlehem was 
supposed to be this company that's your buddy, right? And so the foreman came over 
to me and say, "Well, you know, these dust collectors , you're supposed to wear 'em 
everywhere," he said. But most of the guys here, we just leave them in the dinner hall. 
The dinner hall is like this very dry, dusty place sometimes. And so, you don't-, you're 
not in the face of the mine collecting dust. So there were miners who bought into that, 
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at a certain level. There were miners who were sometimes more rewarded by the 
company, you know, they got a little better position, they got a little extra work, even 
though this stuff is supposed to be regulated by contract. There were people who 
were-, who said, "Well, the company's a lot better than they used to be," or, "This 
company's been good to me." You know, "This company's taken care of me. I've been 
here a long time." And so, you get these differences. Some of the young people, they 
used to call them, what did they call them? Red, they'd say, you know, these guys 
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know, ready to get kicked on. And so, you have these inside of the locals, you know, 
you have these conflicts between these workers who were-, who bought into this stuff. 
Even bought into the stuff about why we strike. They-, you know, the company 
propaganda that said, "Ah, they just go out every time it's deer hunting season or every 
time somebody coughs, they have a strike," you know .... every time somebody coughs 
they have a strike, you know, or whatever the excuse. When it rains, they don't want to 
work in the rain, you know, they don't want to go· to-work in the rain, so they strike. And 
that's nonsense. But, but there were, there were miners who accepted that at a certain 
level. Sometimes they were active in the union leadership positions, you know. It 
depended. But they bought into this stuff. And so, they'd be, and in 750 where I 
worked, they were arguing very strongly against striking, under any conditions. 
Leadership of that local. 
LAE: Uh, I'm curious as to how the leadership of the union responded, you know, as 
obviously the more militant or more radical miners were taking matters into their own 
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hands. What was the response of the union? 
JT: The District 17 leadership was not against any strikes. I was hired explicitly to 
defend strikes. And they would give, as they used to say, a wink and a nod, about 
going back to work. But they were not against the strikes. I can-, this was a District 17 
leadership that came in, was Arnold Miller and the reformed platform, you know ..... 
LAE: Was this an official position or ... .. ? 
JT: Oh, no, legally you couldn't do that, because you would expose the union to all 
kinds of liability. We were under a legal duty to try to get the miners back to work. And 
we had to play this game. But unofficially, everybody knew what the deal was. And it 
wasn't only the official-, the top five officers in the district, it was all the uh, the field 
reps, by and large, were also in that reform. The only, the only field rep I can remember 
that was against the union, is now president of the district, is Bob Phalen. But Bob had 
been a Tony Boyle supporter. Yeah, Bob was a Tony man. So, you know, he basically 
took the conservative side. But all the rest of them, Bill Keys, and all of them, they were 
not against these strikes, no. 
LAE: Okay. All right. So we, we are building up here. We have gone through a sort of 
dramatic scene here, in terms of the Buffalo Creek uh, demonstration of support for Sim, 
Howze. We're discussing the continued striking. At some point, all these sort of 
connected, but isolated flair-ups, became what I call the great anti-injunction strike. (JT: 
Okay, all right) So, what tipped it over into that? 
JT: Let, let me deal with that first, from my perception of it as a lawyer. Because I 
mean, sort of fast-frame forward to 1975 and the first part of 1976, and they're still out 
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there striking . So, in June of '76, there was a strike in Kanawha County at the Cedar 
Coal Company mines, Local 1766 and 1759. And I, I think somebody was fired. I can't 
remember the exact. ... . But those were sister locals. They were up there in Kanawha 
County near Cheylan on Slaughter's Creek and on Cabin Creek. There was a strip and 
there was a deep mine. You had, you know, they struck and then there was an 
injunction. And there was a meeting that I went to over at the uh, Marmet Women's 
Club--that's where these locals met--the Marmet Women's Club . And uh, in fact, 
GarnP.tt Pritt ; CharlottP. Pritt's fathP.r; was president of one of those locals . And David 
Forrns was the president of the other local. And uh, it was the usual scenario. The 
company, Cedar Coal Company, I should say was a subsidiary of America Electric 
Power. Uh, that's a whole other story. But anyway, they ran to Judge Knapp and got 
their injunction . Then they came in on the Rule-to-Show cause. 
LAE: Could you explain what that is? 
JT: You have to show cause why you're not in contempt. That's what put Sim Howze 
in jail, that he was in contempt of an order. They had showed cause why they were in 
contempt. So, you got both, we're in the big, main courtroom in the district court. 
Judge Knapp is out there. And Judge-, and I should say also, Judge Knapp would 
harangue the miners and he would call them cowards for not crossing the picket line, 
you know. And I remember one local, he compared them to chicken thieves. You 
know ... he was just top stuff to the miners for striking . He thought it was wrong. Later 
on, one of his court reporters, Betty Bradley, told me privately, said, "I told him not to 
talk that way to these people." But anyway, here we are in court, it was a large 
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couriroom, jammed with people. Because you not only have the two locals, these two 
Cedar Coal locals. There was a big local I think from Youngstown Steel, or some place. 
Maybe in McDowell County somewhere a big local. So the whole courtroom, they went 
on to say they were striking, District 29. And the courtroom was full. And, and they, 
and Judge Knapp ... ! tried to say, I said, "Judge, we would just like to tell the miner's 
side of the story." I'll never forget this. He said, "There isn't any side to this story. 
There's an injunction ." And then David Form's's got up, he was hot. And he said, 
"Judae. al! mv life I've been told th8t there'd be iustice in the courts . 8nd here . this sort 
- , ., ,J ' I 
of thing." He was very idealistic. And Judge Knapp said, "You better be quiet, or I'm 
gonna put you in jail." And so, and then they imposed a $50,000 per day fine on those 
locals. Understand that District 29 locals were-, that Jocal was there. They're listening 
to all this stuff. Their lawyer was Darrell McGraw. Darrell could make a speech. And 
he, you know, the judge walked out and Darrell made one of his speeches. And they ... 
LAE: Can you remember anything .... ? 
JT: I can't remember exactly. You know how Darrell McGraw talks. And, and uh, I felt 
so downhearted. I was walking down Quarrier Street toward the office. And my head 
was down, and a car full of these miners came by, said, "Don't get your head down, you 
did good. You did good," he said, "we'll take care of it." And they, they had what was 
called a salt pile meeting up at uh, Cheylan. At that time there was a state road facility 
there where they stored salt. And they had a big pile of salt. And they would meet 
there and have what they called salt pile meetings, where somebody would get up on 
the salt pile and talk. And they organized the strike, with both districts, you know. And 
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it was highly organized . 
LAE: Did they organize it as a national strike? Do you know? 
JT: No, no, I don't-, I don't, you know, I don't know. That's what happened. But I don't 
know. All I know is that suddenly there was this-, everybody was out. And I frankly 
didn't blame them. 
LAE: When you say everybody, who do you mean? 
JT: Well, every mine in District 29 and District 17 within like a day or two. And then 
thpv snrP8rl nnrth 8nrl thP.v tnnk nistrir.t R ::-inrl nistrir.t 11 ::-inrl PVP.ntw~llv thP.v sh1 it 
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down every mine east of the Mississippi. Down in Alabama, Virginia, Kentucky .... 
LAE: Did they not shut down the western mines? 
JT: I think some of them did, but I can't remember exactly. 
LAE: Uh, can I go back ..... 
JT: It was explicitly against the injunctions. I mean, everybody, they were just 
outraged by what Judge Knapp had done and how they coal company had gotten this 
injunction. 
LAE: I want to backtrack because people will be using this transcript, or listening to this 
. tape that are not familiar with things. Would you identify Darrell ~Graw for us? 
JT: Darrell McGraw was a populist lawyer from uh, Wyoming County. Down around 
Mullins, Pineville, and those places. And he became, I mean, he could really make a 
speech. And he ran for the Supreme Court of West Virginia and won, took office in-, 
not long afterwards, about '76 or '78, something like that. But you know, it was an 
activist court. And the whole Supreme court changed. And then, he served, I think one 
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or two terms, and then was defeated and is now the Attorney General for the state of 
West Virginia, serving his second term. 
LA E: For those using the transcript or tape, there is an interview in the collection of 
Darrell McGraw. As a matter of fact, it was done this summer, and I do not know if they 
touched on this. Okay, so, the great anti-injunction strike took off. David, wou!d you 
share your perceptions of, of this sort of same period of time? 
DG: I'm trying to think and remember. [chuckles] I remember the strike. I don't 
remember about what happened in relationship to out west . I know that mines shut 
down fairly rapidly. There were roving pickets, uh [pausing for thought] ... (LAE: Go 
ahead) ... 
JT: I know from conversations with some miners that took part in this, they had, it was 
highly organized . They used CB radios, and, and they divided the whole-, everything 
up into areas, it was like a military campaign. And they had, you know, people who 
were in charge at various squads, who had responsibility for specific geographies 
areas. And they communicated by CB's. And they were very effective in it. And I 
remember. One poignant story I remember .. .. we had a local president down in Boone 
County, his name was Kenneth Lovejoy. And this, this very sincere man, he believed in 
the contract and that they should strike. And he was humpback. Emmett was 
humpbacked because he had spent all of life shoveling coal along the ribbon in a 
hunched over position . And, and the, the uh, the phrase that the miners used to 
describe people who were trying to beat the picket line, became a lovejoy. They would 
say on the CB, "There's a lovejoy over at such and such place," like a code, right? 
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They stopped people like Emmett who were trying to get to work. I felt so sorry for him, 
because he was trying-, he was such an honest man. He was trying to do what he 
could, and he was hauled into court, his local was in contempt and he was just tore up . 
I remember, we walked out of Judge-, he told Judge Knapp he was doing his best. And 
I felt so sorry for him. I put my arm around him ... . 
LAE: Was he an official? 
JT: Yeah, he was a local president. I put my arm around him as we walked out, 
LAE: So, what you're saying is that a lot of people were conflicted . 
JT: I don't know about a lot, but there was some. 
LAE: Did-, was he aware that he had become a, a .... 
JT: No, that was part of the poignancy of it. He didn't know. I knew that the term 
"lovejoy", his name had become an epithet. He didn't know that. He was just so, he 
was .. ... 
DG: There were two things that I was thinking about while John was talking. One is, 
that there was one of the agreements against striking at this point. Even though this 
was really well-organized against wildcats, against continued striking, was loss of 
wages, that people were talking about how many days they've lost wages from strikes 
in the past years. And so there was a kind of force working here. And , and also, that 
the other thing I was thinking, was that once a mine would shut down, there didn't need 
to be pickets at it. But people showed up at rallies or at meetings, to find out what was 
the latest. But they didn't, you didn't need pickets. The mines were shut down, people 
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didn't go to work. And even those people who were conservative, wouldn't try to go to 
work. You know, who were, who were not supportive. They-, so that it was pretty tight 
and it was, it sort of was almost mysteriously tight like that. 
LAE: Yes? [speaking to John Taylor] 
JT: Arnold Miller became paranoid about me in this period, and he thought that I was 
the leader of it. Which I've always thought was very contemptuous of the membership, 
that a lawyer would lead this miners. Miller got that idea because my practice from day 
nnP. W8S I wrnllrl r.811 I wrnllrl nP.t r.8lls in whP.rP. whn W8S nn strikP. ;:inrl whP.rP. Anrl if - • · · . " . . " I • ' • " . 0 " . . . " . " . - . - . - - • • . • ' . • . • . . 
the districts didn't-, sub-districts didn't call, I would call them. Because I needed to 
know who was striking and where and over what. And in Arnold Miller's mind, it 
became that the lawyer was the nerve center, you know, directing all these pickets. 
And, and at that-, there was a 
became a lot of anger at Arnold Miller at this point. For just generally .... 
LAE: Can we clarify that the pickets were striking in opposition to the official position to 
the union, as well as against the company? 
JT: Well, yeah, because Arnold Miller and the lawyers over at headquarters said, 
"We've got to take the position that we're against this." 
LAE: And they were truly against it? As opposed to District 17? 
JT: I believe so, as I recall. (LAE But the .... ) There was a lot of tension between the 
District 17 leadership and Arnold Miller. I mean, they had been stronger supporters of 
him, and they had been disillusioned by the weakness of his administration. It was just 
weak. And they didn't like the fact that the lawyers were running the union, which was 
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basically what was happening . And .... 
LAE: They didn't like the fact that the lawyers in Washington (JT: In Washington). Who 
were those lawyers? 
JT: Oh, Rick Bank, Tom, I don't know if Tom Geohagen was there, 
DG: 
JT: Joe [inaudible] .... wasn't with them at that point. Harrison Combs, who became 
general counsel. A lot of conservative . 
Jock Jablonski, Jock was-, I don't remember if Jablonski was on staff then at that time. 
Rich Trumka was on staff then. I can't remember the names of all these people. I 
remember they put Jim Haviland in a very bad position, because he was getting a lot of 
pressure from the legal staff in Washington to do something . Because they felt like the 
international was going to be exposed to a lot of liability. 
LAE: So essentially this, this injunction strike then was against the, union-, the 
international companies and the federal judiciary? 
JT: I would say that's a fair way to say it. Arnold Miller came to town several times. 
But he was so frightened of the members. That's what I remember, he was frightened 
of the membership, that he came to the District 17 headquarters, but he didn't do it 
publicly. There was, people didn't know this, but up on the 3rd floor of the 
headquarters, just several little offices up there. You wouldn't know they were there 
unless you, you know, knew the building. He would go to the 3rd floor and stay there. 
And then, nights he would go to the Heart-of-Town. He wouldn't even go up Cabin 
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Creek where he lived--he'd stay at the Heart-of-Town motel. 
LAE: Who did he meet with when he came to town? Do you know? 
JT: I don't know. He had-, by that time , he had surrounded himself with flunkies, you 
know. And, and uh, he had bodyguards. He would call them international 
representatives . But they were bodyguards. But uh, yeah, [inaudible] .... . 
And they would tell him what he wanted to hear. It was a sad situation. 
LAE: You've talked about the issue of lost wages, and the, the strike is now continuing. 
And the comoanv is s;:ivino r.ert:::iin thinas to thP. rm=!ss If vou r,rnJlrl sort of think rihrn1t 
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the local communities and people you knew at that time, would you say that essentially 
families and communities ..... 
END OF SIDE 2 - TAPE 1 
BEGIN SIDE 1 - TAPE 2 
LAE: Okay. 
DG: During 1975 I worked for Bethlehem Steel. And after that, I worked some with 
UMW District 17, and with West Virginia Tech , doing classes and trying to arrange for-, 
setup education and education program with miners, partly, partly because of what had 
happened. Okay, during-, I think during a large part of the strike, and strikes that was 
going on, there was a lot of community support for the miners. But I, I think it's 
important to know that there was a war going on , not just the miners striking . But a war 
of ideas about whether striking was a legitimate thing to do. Even though there was 
long history. But there was a lot, a lot of campaigning going by the coal companies, 
and also by the state of West Virginia by the courts that was the part that was being 
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publicized, that miners were being reckless, that they were violent, that they were not 
under anybody's control, the union was out of control, that uh, they were not, you know, 
that these were young red necks who were just striking at the drop of a hat. And lots of 
stuff. And without much on the other side, other than the miners' solidarity, there was 
some local support for this stuff that was happening in the communities. I mean, I 
know, I know very personally that miners wives were saying to them, "When is this 
going to end?" And some were supporting the strike very clearly, and organizing, by 
"Where's the next check corning from? What's gonna go on?" All this kind-, all this 
kind of questions were being pushed hard and uh, and I don't think the union did much 
for the striking miners, did very much to educate or to inform people enough about. ... 
And they weren't necessarily organized for that. Either-, I don't know if there was an 
awareness of what was needed, besides staying out till Hell freezes over, which nobody 
could really do anyway, you know. So, I think that, that's just an important piece, 
because people were, there was a fight over ideas . And this question of the whole 
question of whether the miners could strike legally or illegally and get away with it. And 
what was going on was this sort of restriction of the miners rights. The miners ability to 
do-, use that tool to get, you know, protect themselves. 
LAE: Okay, in terms of telling the story, there's a point about, it wasn't clear that Sim 
Howze ever got out of jail. Could you just sort of ... . ? 
JT: Yeah, I can't remember the exact details of it. But there was an arrangement or 
settlement around that, between Sim and the union, and the coal company and Judge 
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Knapp, that [inaudible] ... he decided to save face . He got out of jail. There was some 
fines against the local, and they worked it out that the company forgave the fines. They 
just, they tried to just smooth it over, forget about it. But of course, strikes continued 
unabated. And [inaudible] .... up into 1976. You want me to speak now about how that 
went into .... ? 
LAE: Well, or it. .. . we're sort of in the middle of it. And it spread . I mean, we got to the 
point where it's-, all the mines closed east of the Mississippi, and perhaps some of the 
W8Stern on8s And what is th8 reaction of the courts 8nd wh::it is th8 re:::iction of thP. 
companies. You've spoken of the reaction of the international union. So what are the 
reactions of the other sides? That you can remember, a day that you could speak to 
us, as well? 
JT: Well, 1-, it's just a blur to me, because I was in court almost constantly. I mean, I 
could speak to the legal maneuvering that went on in various supreme court 
LAE: [inaudible] .. .. 
JT: Okay, well, I had mentioned earlier that the injunction labor law came from the 
Boys market case, where you could not strike over arbitratable disputes. And then, uh, 
there had been a case where Armco came to court down here, in the southern district, 
and Judge, over the questions of pickets, and whether that was Arbitratable. And 
Judge Knapp had said that it wasn't arbitratable. Judge Knapp was a fair man. And he 
came from Madison, Boone County. He'd worked underground. And then Armco took 
him down to the court circuit on appeal--this is a whole other strike we're talking about--
and they reversed-, that said Judge Knapp was wrong . And then, at about the same 
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time the strike was going on, the US Supreme Court came out with a decision against, 
involving Buffalo Forge Company, and the machinists, I think. There was a court up in 
New York in the 3rd Circuit, and that court said that pickets were not [inaudible] . You 
could not get an injunction if there were pickets. And we're all saying, "Yes." And I felt 
so cocky. I remember I was in court with the company lawyers. And I had said, "By 
God, let's find out what this Buffalo Forge means." So, we're in front of Judge-, I can't 
remember which judge it was. And 1-, they mouse trapped me very neatly. Because I 
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temporary restraining order, not an injunction . We hadn't taken any testimony, no 
testimony. And, or minimal testimony. And the judge says, "You want more testimony 
and you want more time, Mr. Taylor?" And I said, "No." I'm relying on Buffalo Forge. 
So, you know, he-, then the judge, I can't remember what judge it was, but he ruled 
against us and says it was injunctionable. I can't remember.... Anyway, the next thing 
we know, we're down in the [inaudible] .. . circuit in Abington, Virginia, in front this awful 
judge, Judge Widner, who's very anti-miner, this old boy. And we're-, Jim Haviland and 
I are down talking to this man and trying , trying .. .. He's very hostile and he's trying-, 
you know, we're trying to placate this man, and talk a~ ut Buffalo Forge and he didn't 
want to hear about Buffalo Forge, you know. And, and uh , it was just a disaster legally. 
It was one of the worst mistakes I ever made as a lawyer, to be so aggressive. We, we 
were, we had nothing to say. There was no testimony from the locals about what, you 
know, what were the underlying causes of the dispute. So, that, I was going back and 
forih all the time to the court. Not only on the local aspects, because every coal 
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company in southern West Virginia came in to court to get their injunction, you know, to 
get their morning orders on, on this particular strike. So I was in court all the time. 
Then running down to the 4th circuit, Adington, Virginia . It's just a blur to me now. 
LAE: Could you talk a little bit about visiting the locals, and talking with them, and some 
of the incidents that occurred then? 
JT: Oh ... well, one, one of the things that I had to do as, when they would strike, not just 
on this one, but on all of them, all the strikes, I would have to go out to the locals and 
find out either talk to the mine committee. or go to a local meeting and find out what 
was going on. Because the court would want to say, "What's going on, Mr. Taylor? 
Why are they doing this?" That period of time I devised what was known- , what I called 
the hands-up defense, where the judge would say, "What's going on, Mr. Taylor?" and I 
would hold up my hands and say, "I don't know, Judge." [chuckles] Or if I did know, 
and it was favorable, I would say, you know.... But I remember explicitly in the Buffalo 
Creek uh, ·strike, the Sim Howze strike, I was, I went down to a local meeting late at-, at 
night, at Lundale, Lundale Grade School. And almost all the Buffalo Creek locals was 
there. The gymnasium was packed . And I, when I went down there, Judge Hall knew 
that I was going. And he said, "Would you tell them , tell them Judge : iall said to get 
back to work." So I went down there and there was all this crowd and I said, "I've got to 
tell you this message. This is a message from Judge Hall," that's what I said. And, and 
uh, I said, "Judge Hall wants you all to obey his injunction and go back to work." There 
was just like an explosion of sound, you know, that basically he should come down and 
tell us his own self, if he wants us to go back to work. "Get that judge down here," they 
-36-
said. And, I, I've really-, it's such a blur. The only meetings in the injunction strike that 
I, in '76 that I remember, the ones over at the Marmet Women's Club, they would 
always be packed, and they always agreed that they should keep the strike going, keep 
going . Because there was big fines, you know, against the local, $50,000 a day or 
some damn thing , I can't remember. 
LAE: Well, talk a little bit about those fines. I mean, once the whole thing was closed 
down, was every local being fined? 
JT: Every local was under threat of being fined , and so was the district and so was the 
international. So, we had to placate the court system, that the various levels of the 
union were either, either trying hard-, damndest to get 'em back to work, or it was such 
a difficult situation that it would be humanly impossible to get them back to work. 
LAE: But fines were levied? 
JT: Fines were levied. The court-, coal companies had a, like a formula for damages 
on the strikes. They would come out and they would .... wouldn't stand up under cross-
examination, but they would bring an accountant and they'd have a calculation of how 
many tons of coal they were losing per shift. What that cost. They would have all the 
cost, the, the uh , fixed cost of running the mines: electricity, you know, all the things 
that had to go into the, pay maintenance crews, you know, having supervisors work and 
try to maintain the mines and keep it in working order. And they had this whole format 
when we cross-examined these, these accountants, we'd ask questions that they 
couldn't answer, but it didn't really matter. The judge was going to issue a fine . He's 
going to issue an order saying, "You were fined such and such an amount of money. 
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And then, usually what would happen, they would go back to work . And everything 
would be sort of forgotten in the interest of peace. 
LAE: Okay, that's in the period leading up to the great-, great injunction? 
JT: Oh, and afterwards, too. But all these locals were subject to fines . 
LAE: Okay. But during this-, what's the exact time period of the great anti-injunction 
strikes? 
JT: It started, it started just before the annual vacation period in either June or July 
1976. And they went off on-. it was started . And then they went off on vacation and 
people'd say, "Well, maybe after vacation, they'll get it out of their system, they'll come 
back from vacation. No, it didn't work, they took their vacations and then came back 
and struck, continuing ..... So it's just June and July of 1976. I can't remember the 
exact dates. 
LAE: Did it not start again in 1977? 
JT: Well, that's part of this whole process that we talked about. In 1977, there was a 
wide-spread strike over the decision of the international union and the health and 
welfare fund, pension fund, to no longer .... in fact, it was in the contract, maybe. I can't 
remember, no, it wasn't in the contract. They made a unilateral decision in Washington 
that there no longer would be what was known as the 85 HS health card, which every 
miner had. Which meant that you get benefits from the Health & Welfare fund. Instead, 
they allowed some companies to hire their own insurance, either Blue Cross or 
Prudential. And people were just outraged at that. And there was a big strike about 
that in the summer of 1977. 
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mines? 
JT: I believe there were, but I'm not sure. 
DG: There were new people hired .. .. there was almost a sort of wave of hiring in early 
'75, and late, or early '75. And uh, I think these were in , from some of what I saw was, 
there was a mixture of miners, older and younger. But there were like some, some 
bands, from Logan County I know there was, there was a couple of [inaudible] ... . 
and miners who come traveling around, you know, young guys who were, who couldn't 
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we have to go to court about all these things?" You know, like they'd have a safety 
question or some kind of grievance at a local. And they'd say, "We want this settled 
here and now, (JT: Right) . And what they were told was, uh, you couldn't, if you did 
anything about it, you had to deal with that in court . And in order to deal with it, you had 
to go through a legal procedure. The further it was away from the mine, they more they 
said, you know, "This is not going to happen. This is not getting what we want." 
JT: That jogs my memory. They were right. Because in the contract under grievance 
procedures, it says explicitly that both sides agree that they will try to settle disputes 
without recourse to court. Those four words were in there. And people can read 
English. It said , "Without recourse to court". And here's these damn companies 
running to court to get their morning orders. 
LAE: Okay. Can we go back now? We're in the middle of the injunction strike. 
Everyth ing was shut down. Pressure is being brought there. What happens? 
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JT: Well, I'm not sure at what the mechanism of this was. But what I remember was, 
that Jim Haviland and I were called at the union legal offices and told the judge (LAE: In 
Charleston?) in Charleston. We were told, and I can't even remember who made the 
call. But Judge Knapp was willing to back down. And, and he would publically 
apologize. So, what he did was, he set a hearing on contempt for the locals, there was 
two Cedar Coal locals. And he set it on a Saturday morning. So, and .. .. 
LAE: What was the significance of the Saturday morning? 
.JT: Nobody'~ thP.rP. 
LAE: Nobody meaning .... ? 
JT: Press, coal miners. And there was a lot, you know, the New York Times had, you 
know, one of their top reporters, Ben Franklin was down there . I mean, this got a lot of 
national coverage. And he did it sort of secretly. And I, I tried to get people to come 
out and witness it. But I could only get one guy who would come out on a Saturday 
morning. I remember him, Sonny Holstein . Worked for Amer-, worked for Cedar Coal, 
lived down in South Charleston . And I said, I knew him, and I said, "You come out and, 
you know, witness this ." And then there was a reporter from the Charleston Gazette 
was there . So it was just a couple of us. And Judge Knapp came out and apologized. 
And, and, and (LAE: So .... ) and canceled the fines. (LAE: So .. .. ) And there was such-, 
at some point, there was, you know, they would go back to work .... if he would 
apologize. 
LAE: So David Forms was not there? (JT: No) So, the people that he had degraded 
were not present at the time of the apology? 
-41-
JT: No, no, no. Frankly, I don't think they would have given it the dignity of showing up 
anyway, frankly; I don't know. The miners .... I remember I talked to Howard Greene, 
and he .... (LAE: Who was Howard?) Howard Greene was at that point, a field 
representative over in uh, Boone County field . But he was very strong politically, and 
later became sub-district 2 executive board member in charge of (DG: He was head of 
District 17) no, he never-, no, he became an international board member for District 17. 
But he was very politically influential. And he was-, I can't remember how active that 
know, Howard said, "Just get Sonny Holstein and that'll be all right." And I told him, I 
said, "Howard , I really want the people [inaudible] .... And so .. .. 
LAE: How were the men told? 
JT: They were just-, I don't know again, I don't know the mechanism. I remember that 
there were all kinds of radio announcements all through the coal fields, from the union 
and everybody, that they should all go back to work . And they did . 
LAE: Did it say that the judge had apologized? 
JT: Can't remember. 
LAE: Do you remember, David? 
DG: I don't remember that. 
JT: Somebody should get the newspapers and stuff, in that period of time, and .. ... 
DG: I seriously doubt it, but I can't remember 
LAE: [inaudible] .. . 
JT: I wasn't thinking fast enough. I should have had, ordered a transcript of that, of 
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what he said. 
LAE: Now, this is the kind of-, someone using the transcript can do research, so ..... 
But, I'm confused, because the union was telling the people to go back to work anyway. 
I mean, that was part of their initial duties. So what would make this radio 
announcement different than others? 
JT: It was a radio announcement. The other times they would-, he would tell them to 
go back to work, but you do it in a local meeting . So that you could say, "Boys, you 
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say, "Boys, you gotta go back to work," and they, the miners would go out, after the 
meeting, go out somewhere and say, "I'm not, uh-huh, we aren't gonna listen to an old 
man. We're gonna keep striking." 
DG: But John, I don't remember this . Was, was it the impression that they got what 
they were out for? 
JT: I believe it was. But how that impression was conveyed I don't know. (DG: Yeah, 
yeah) You'd have to ask some of the guys who were, you know, if you could find David 
Forms, or talk to Garnett or somebody, you know, find out how that happened. 
LAE: Okay. 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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LAE: It's July 29th, 1998, and I'm Lynda Ann Ewen with the Oral History of Appalachia 
Program at Marshall University. And I'm interviewing John Taylor and David Greene, 
and the general subject is the anti-injunction strikes of the mid-1970's. Could I ask 
each of you to give your name? And I'm going to ask you to indicate your agreement 
that these interviews be made part of the Special Collections of the library at Marshall 
University. 
JT: My name is John Taylor, and yes, I agree, that this whatever product of this 
conversation can be added to the Marshall University Special Collections Library. 
DG: My name is David Greene and I agree, also. 
LAE: John, would you tell us a little bit about yourself, why you were involved and what 
was your relationship to the United Mine Workers at the time of the strikes? 
JT: I came to Charleston, West Virginia in March of 1975 from Detroit. And I was hired 
by District 17 UMWA, specifically to do legal work defending the wild cat strikes that 
were prevalent in southern West Virginia at that time. 
LAE: David? 
DG: I came to West Virginia in 1967 as part of the VISTA program, and was involved in 
a lot of community and community organizing and political education efforts during the 
'60's and '?O's. And in 1974, -5, and -6, was involved with the United Mine Workers in 
different ways, and '77 as well, working in the mines for a year in '75 and working with 
the UMW in different ways around that time. 
LAE: Let me begin with the Buffalo Creek Flood. Which occurred in .. .. 
JT: February of 1972. 
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LAE: And because-, John, could you tell us a little bit about what you believe to be the 
connections between the Buffalo Creek flood and the beginnings of some of the 
wildcats? 
JT: Yeah, that connection didn't become explicit to me until I had a conversation with 
Sim Howze, who was the president of Local 8054, Laredo, West Virginia, in the spring, 
or late spring, early summer of 1975. There was a strike at that mine, at the strip 
mines, and it was a rather mundane dispute about job bidding on who would drive what 
truck at the strip, Buffalo Mining-, Pittston Coal Company's strip. And the strike seemed 
to cause a lot of anger and bitterness. And the miners at the local said they just 
absolutely would not go back until this man was put on a truck that he wanted . And I 
asked Sim Howze why, why were the the miners so adamant about this issue. And he 
said, "Well, it's part-, it all stemmed from the flood. And they wanted to get back at 
Pittston, they wanted to get back at Pittston and they decided that they would do that. 
They, there was bitterness in the community, and they, they wanted to get back at 
them. 
LAE: Would you describe your perceptions of that Buffalo Creek local, in terms of 
racial composition? 
JT: Well, it was almost entirely white. But the president, Sim Howze, who'd been 
president for a long time, was black, African American. As time went by, I have 
discovered that on Buffalo Creek there were a number of African American individuals 
who were very influential in the affairs of the union and the community. One that I met 
early on, and was introduced to me by Jack Perry, who's president of District 17, was a 
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fellow named Early Jones. And Early Thomas, Early Thomas. And you know, they-, 
Jack Perry told me that they, he took me and introduced me to Early Thomas and told 
me how much he respected this man. 
LAE: In this particular dispute over the truck driver, was the truck driver white or black? 
JT: Yes, he was white. 
LAE: Okay. David, would you share with us some of your perceptions of the aftermath 
of the Buffalo Creek flood in terms of people's anger and consciousness? 
DG: Yeah. Well, I think a lot of things, I mean, you could go back a lot further than 
Buffalo Creek, though. I think Buffalo Creek probably brought out some strong feelings 
and relationships. I mean, there's such a long history of the coal company's abuse and 
exploitation of both the miners and the families, the communities, the disregard for life, 
and at the, to the benefit of making lots of money off the coal. A lot of resentment for-, 
about coal company land that was taxed at a lower level, uh, properties, a lot of 
resentment about the fact that coal companies, people would sit by all the time and see 
coal go out of the community on the coal train, sometimes 500-cars long, and have lots 
of unemployment, or have employment that cost people their lives, employment that 
resulted in Black Lung and injury, and employment, or lack of employment. So, there's 
a lot of sense of outrage that sort of seems to me that seethes underneath the surface 
about what the coal companies represent. And the coal-, it's so glaring in Appalachia 
and West Virginia because it's such a major extractive industry. So there's, there's 
some of that I think that's real important for anybody to know about, that that's there. 
think Buffalo Creek where a hundred and hundred and how many people? 
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JT: A hundred and twenty-five. 
DG: A hundred twenty-five people lost their lives. People just almost rose up 
spontaneously. And while the newspapers and radios were filled with a bunch of stuff 
saying this was an act of God and this was, you know, we shouldn't criticize Pittston, 
say anything about what happened. Uh, people were just, you know, could hardly 
believe it, even though they knew, knew the things coal companies were doing. 
JT: Let, let me pick up the thread that he just mentioned, and focus on a particular 
aspect of coal field life, and that was the union and the administration of contract and 
grievance procedure. Because the, the anti-injunction strike, as we call it, occurred in 
June of 1976. The strike, the job bidding strike that I mentioned occurred in the spring 
of 1975. And when I, when I came down to Detroit in March of 1975, I was .. . l was 
amazed at the frequency of Wildcat strikes. Because our law firm-, I had been fired in a 
Wildcat strike at Chrysler, axel plant in May of 1970. And then I was in private practice, 
and our firm had defended several Wildcat strikes in the auto industry in the Detroit 
area. In fact, we became known for doing that. But I wasn't ready for 3 or 4 strikes in 
the morning, and a couple, three more in the afternoon, maybe some more on 
midnights. I mean, I was in the injunction court in Charleston, at the Federal 
courthouse in Charleston, just all the time. And there was a, a breakdown of the 
grievance procedure. In fact, one of the first cases I did, like in May, April or May of 
1975, was an attempt by the Kanawha Coal Operators Association, to get an injunction 
against the mines ... well, the mines that comprised the Kanawha Coal Operators 
Association, members of the Carbon Fuel Company and Imperial Colliery and 
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Bethlehem Mines, Valley Camp Coal Company and you know, those-, those 
companies. And when I talked to the union field reps, for that in the Kanawha sub-
district, they said that the Kanawha coal operators personnel and Jackson and Kelly, 
their lawyer, were deliberately refusing to settle grievances at the first and second and 
even third steps, and forcing everything to arbitration. Because the coal association 
field reps got paid more, the more cases they arbitrated. And we, we proved that in a 
court of law, before Judge K.K. Holmes, tough judge. He refused their injunction, said 
they needed to clean their act up. That was like a prelude to this whole thing in Buffalo 
Creek. So there was, there was like an atmosphere where the coal company was just 
absolutely not going to cooperate. And then, on top of that, there was the aftermath of 
the bitterness of the flood and the other factors that David has mentioned . David didn't 
mention the gasoline strike of 1974 (DG: That's right) These people would strike uh, 
you know, the gasoline strike of '74 was over the policy of rationing gasoline and the 
miners couldn't get enough fuel, gasoline for their cars to get to work because a lot of 
'em had to drive long distances just to get out and do their shifts. So this is like a 
continuum. And then, like we say, we ... we beat back the Kanawha operators, and this 
other thing jumped off down in Buffalo Creek. 
LAE: And what was, if there was, the connection between the Buffalo Creek strike and 
the building of the continuation of the Wildcat movement to the injunction strike? 
JT: Okay, good, good question. Well, the coal companies throughout, well , in District 
17 and District 29, which is down in Beckley ... 
LAE: Would you briefly tell us what comprised District 17? 
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JT: All right, District 17 basically was from Clay County down to the northern part of 
Wyoming County and then to the state line. And then District 29 was everything south 
of that line, Wyoming County down to McDowell County and Raleigh County. You 
know, there's a lot of people down there. And in fact, when I hired on in District 17, I 
had 25,000 working and District 29 had about 15,000 working. And this is not even 
saying anything about District 31 in Northern West Virginia, or District 6 up in the 
Northern Panhandle and Ohio. There was, I mean, I just say that to bring out that 
there's a whole lot of jobs that existed then that are gone now. 
LAE: Back to my question. Do you remember the question? (JT: No) A connection 
between the Buffalo Creek strike and .... 
JT: Oh, sure. The ... the coal companies continued to abuse the uh, process, the 
grievance process. They continued to run to the court for injunctions against strikes, 
rather than trying to implement procedure and settle disputes at the mine site, which is 
what they were supposed to do. And they would, they were just promiscuous with-, and 
they would go-, and the judges were promiscuous in granting the injunctions. Judge 
Knapp and to a lesser extent, Judge-, Judge Hall was relatively new, but Judge Knapp 
was just, he was easy, he was easy. And the coal companies .... 
LAE: Easy for whom? 
JT: For the coal companies. And the uh, the law firms that represented these people, 
made plenty of money. Jackson and Kelly-, of course, we didn't have computers then, 
but they had typewriters that had what was called a Mag Card in it, which was like a 
canned complaint for an injunction. So they can crank out a complaint for an injunction 
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and a temporary restraining order in like a half hour or so, and make-, I don't know, 
someone told me they made like $1500 per case just for doing that. Just like 15 
minutes work for some employee. And they would run over to Judge Knapp and then 
they would say, they would call me. They would call me and they'd say, "There's a 
strike at Valley Camp on this first shift, and the issue's safety or job bidding or 
whatever. And court. 
LAE: For people that don't understand, would you go just briefly what the process 
should have been? You mentioned, first, second , third levels. 
JT: All right. The grievance procedure had four steps. The first step was a meeting 
between the miner and his immediate supervisor. The second step was a meeting 
between the mine, mine committee and local mine management. The third step you 
would get field reps from the union and represent-, you know, Kanawha Coal Operators 
Association reps, Logan Operators Association, or Mingo Operators Association. And 
fourth step was supposed to be arbitration. And labor law at that time said that you 
cannot, the union could not strike over anything that was arbitratable. And the union, 
the contract ... defined ... the scope of the arbitration clause became very large in the 
1978 contract, and included local trouble of any kind . But before that, it technically, 
pickets, pickets were not supposed to be arbitratable. Therefore, it would be injunction 
proof. But that's a whole legal complex piece of legal history that we don't need to go 
into. But anyway, that's a sketch of what the procedure was-, how it was supposed to 
operate, but didn't. 
DG: I think that also between 1972 and '76, '77, that uhm, let me step back. I don't 
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know who this exactly, who's gonna exactly hear this. But I think people should know 
real clearly that working in the mines is extremely hazardous, under the best of 
conditions, under the most safe, most well-mechanized, you know, it's very dangerous, 
tremendously dangerous. And more dangerous for new people, but still really 
dangerous. And not just the hazards of Black Lung, but equipment, explosions, fast 
moving cables, air, questions, sides, roofs, you know, of the mines. And all this stuff is 
really, sort of has laid the context of some of this stuff. And I think right, as the 
companies said send everything to arbitration, you know, they also were getting away 
with procedures in the mines that risk lives. (JT: Right, right) And so I, in working in 
1975 and talking to a lot of people over the years, I know this is true. I worked for 
Bethlehem, Bethlehem Steel, Bethlehem Mines Corporation in '75, and Bethlehem was 
relatively safe compared to some other companies. They still flaunted the safety rules. 
And they still told people to go out in unsupported top and all this kind of stuff where it 
was dangerous. And so, miners uh, based on all kinds of things, sharpened their 
willingness to say, "Hell with this. I'm not, we're not working today." And I think that 
even though the companies portrayed this bunch of stuff as deer hunting holidays, you 
know, they said the miners just want more deer hunting [inaudible].... That's why 
they're going out, you know, quitting work today, or closing down the mines, striking. 
That in reality, there, there were a tremendous amount, tremendous number of 
incidents where people were being pushed to do unsafe stuff. And sometimes they did 
it, and sometimes people walked out. And so there was all these instances all over the 
coal fields. And I went to work in that one year of 1975, there were twenty wildcats that 
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affected the place I worked. And probably more. It wasn't that militant of a local. But 
people would show up-, four guys would show up at the mouth of a hollow or 
somewhere, and say, "We're not working today." You know. And it would be based on, 
and at first, you don't even necessarily find out what's going on right away. But a day 
or two later, or later in the day, I do know that somebody did something, you know, 
some Carbon Fuel or somebody pushed past a certain point. (JT: Yeah, right) 
LAE: Could you just briefly talk about pickets and the process of people from one mine 
picketing another? One of you? John? 
JT: Well, it's just. .. I grew up in a coal mining family. It's just an article of faith that you 
not, that you do not cross the picket line. And if you cross the picket line, you will be 
punished. There were people who would cross picket lines and come back and find 
their car windshields all smashed, or you, they would cross the picket lines and work 
and come out in their clothes and so forth, and the bathhouse would be trashed. Or 
instances where people that crossed picket lines they would get beat up. I mean, you 
just don't cross a picket line. And they took very serious 
there's an oath that mine workers take, publically, at the local hall when they are 
initiated. It says, "I will not wrong a brother, nor will I see him wronged." You see? And 
they took that very seriously, which is correct, they should do that. And .... 
LAE: Why, why would men from one mine picket another company's mine? 
JT: Because their brothers were being wronged. They just took it on faith. If a brother 
said, "There's something bad here, we ain't working, you ain't working, either," and that 
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was it. 
DG: And there was a sense that the more, just truly, the more that you could shut down, 
the more strength you would have in dealing with coal companies. And sometimes not 
even the same company. But you could put pressure on one to put pressure on 
another. But they were, people were moved around, advanced, at certain, at different 
times during that period. And shut down a number of mines, or talked to fellow workers, 
other miners in those miners, and they'd say, "We're with you, brother." And they'd say, 
"Well, you you guys go on, and we're staying here." And you could have very wide-
spread effect. 
JT: Let's not forget these coal operators had associations. They acted organized, 
associative way. And why shouldn't the local union-, the local union doesn't stand by 
itself. It's part of the union, just like the associa-, coal association is. 
LAE: You mentioned, David, at the time the picket line showed up, men may not know 
why it was there, but that you asserted within a day or two, people would generally find 
out. Was that true? I mean, that people did find out what this was about. 
DG: Yeah, yeah, sure, I think there's a really good communication system that's not 
formalized, too, in the coalfield communities. Where, and it's probably a historical 
development that I'm not clear on. But uh, I know that people would communicate. 
You'd show up and I'd show up for work, and there'd be four guys there, you know, or 
six guys and they'd be some of the guys from the mine as well. And nobody would 
cross the picket line. (JT: Right) Nobody would go to work. They'd say, "All right," you 
know. And they'd sometimes ask what's going on, and sometimes the picketers were 
not as clear about the specifics. But still the origin in most of the cases that I knew, not 
every one, the origins of the strike was something very substantive, very having to do . 
with life and health and safety. 
JT: Let, let me give some specific examples and causes ... 
LAE: Can I ask one question, did the men then lose wages for the time they honored 
the line? 
JT: Yes, of course they lost wages. But it was kind of a joke, because this is the way 
the union leadership explained it to me. And that is that the coal companies had 
penalty clauses in their contracts. If they didn't produce a certain amount of coal in a 
certain time, they got penalized under contract. And remember this was the year of the 
Iranian, you know, the OPEC gasoline embargo, and they really needed the coal. I 
mean, the miners understood this very clearly and what was explained to me was, it's 
all right because they'll have to work us overtime, and we'll make it up anyway. 
LAE: Now, what were you going to go ahead and say? 
JT: I was just going to give some examples of some strikes that are sort of outstanding 
in my mind for the causes. I remember one at Valley Camp. No, at Union Carbide. 
Blue Creek, Sanderson, where there was a violation of some safety procedure, under 
the Mine, Health and Safety Act, which came in the 1970's. It was supposed to be 
protected. The safety committee man ordered a withdrawal. And he was punished by 
being forced to work in a water hole under ground. I remember that one clearly. And, 
and, and they struck over that one. We held them off for quite a while. And that was, 
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and I remember one up at Riverton Coal Company up in Powellton Hollow, where the 
men came out to work, and went out in the mines and was supposed to be supplied 
with water. You know, little jugs of water? The water was slimy and green. You 
know ... it was just ... that same coal company, Mr. McQuaid was-, Joe McQuaid was this 
fool that ran the mines. They didn't, they didn't have water for the bathhouse one time. 
He pumped, they pumped water from Armstrong Creek, which is like an open sewer 
into the, into the bathhouse and have the men bathing in that. Then they found out, 
someone, they had the volunteer fire department come out and so, I guess some of the 
firemen knew some of the miners and said, you know, "This water's from Armstrong 
Creek. You better not bathe in it." I mean, that's the sort of thing that would, you know, 
that would, that would cause strikes, and it should have caused strikes. It should have. 
They were absolutely correct to strike at the mine. 
LAE: But as I understand it, they were striking because if they tried to raise it as a 
grievance, nobody would listen. Is that right? 
DG: Well, yeah, you'd file a grievance and there'd be intolerable delays. Even after the 
case ... 
LAE: You haven't, you haven't spoken to that. Would you explain that? 
JT: Okay, even if they would file grievances, nothing would happen n. Even, even not 
withstanding the case I described earlier, about the Kanawha Coal Operators, it just 
continued. The grievance procedure just didn't work. It just didn't work. 
DG: And, the uh, just in line with exactly what John is saying, if you've got an unsafe 
condition or if you've got something that's endangering people's lives, and you file a 
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grievance, you have to wait for a procedure to happen, a legal procedure, where people 
meet, they have a certain number of days they can take. And you have to deal with 
that unsafe condition, as long as the procedure is not, doesn't say "We remedy the 
problem until the grievance procedure." It says, "We wait till the end of the grievance 
process and then we see ifwe correct this thing or not." So people, you know, people 
were not having that. 
LAE: So, would you argue that Buffalo Creek and then the Buffalo Creek strike was sort 
of pivotal, or were they merely a sequence of steps ... 
JT: It was an outstanding step of a sequence. (LAE: Okay) Because we haven't gotten 
into the details, you know, what happened in that strike and what happened to Sim 
Howze and the local. But. ... 
DG: I just want to ... l, I, I think they were important points. But I think it's really important 
to recognize the development of things. And so, this is a developing relationship, a 
developing conflict between labor and the coal companies. (JT: Yes) Historically 
developing a lot longer than this. (JT: That's right) But seething at a certain point. And 
also, uh, you know, responding to other things that are going on, in the [inaudible]. .. 
country. As John said, the oil embargo, the whole, the question of.... There were other 
major strikes in this country in the '?O's by other labor... (JT: Sure) The Dodge strike in 
'7 4 and lots of other ... . 
JT: Yeah, I was fired in one of the major strikes. 
DG: And so, I think these things were, everybody didn't know everything that was going 
on. But they knew pieces and they knew what this climate was about. And there was 
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definitely a climate to uh, keep labor to control labor, you know. And the miners felt, 
they might have not known or understood all the details. But they knew knew what 
was happening. And they could feel-, you could feel it at work. 
JT: See, and then also, this was Vietnam Era. And a number of the miners in the work 
force were returned Vietnam veterans during this period of time. They weren't taking 
any shit. And also, this is the period post miners for democracy and Arnold Miller, and 
the miners were proud. (DG: that's right) and they knew, 
getting democracy in their union. 
DG: That's right. And expectations were high about what should be the result (JT: 
That's rights) of this democracy. 
JT: That's right, that's exactly right. 
LAE: And you would say ... and I hear you arguing that the average miner had a sense 
of this, even though, you know, it may not have been fully detailed. 
JT: Let me .... l worked in the car plants, and was active in the union and so forth. And 
you had to struggle with the United Mine Workers to get a copy of the contract. One of 
the things that stands out, stood out to me down here was that the miners were very 
well educated. They carried the contract around in their pockets. 
LAE: I think you mis-spoke. Did you mean you had to struggle to get a copy of the 
United Auto Workers contract? 
JT: Yeah, it was hard to get it. 
LAE: And the miners here carried the contract? 
JT: Yeah, they gave, when they ratified the contracts, everybody got a copy, you know, 
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and they'd carry them around. It was amazing. They knew the contract. A lot of them 
educated me when I first got down there. 
LAE: So this is not a sort of passive, uneducated ... 
JT: Oh, they were a sophisticated bunch of people. 
DG: Yeah. Now, I don't think miners did not understand a bunch of stuff they needed to 
understand or we all need to understand about what's, what the economics are of the 
situation and what the coal operators are doing behind closed doors, and how they're 
connected even with other giant multinational corporations. But, but they did-, they 
understood how, how they were being treated and how the contract was being 
circumvented and how when they went to work, they were under the control of the 
companies. And that-, you could feel that. And you could feel it more then because 
there was an expectation that "Why should we put up with this?" 
LAE: Okay. So, we've discussed a series of Wildcats, and I want to take you back. 
You said there was some special implications in an ending to the Buffalo Creek Strike 
(JT: Yeah) and I would like you to tell that story, please. 
JT: Okay. Well. .. Judge Hall, K.K. Hall, who's very rigid on the law. And shortly before 
we came to court with the Buffalo Creek strike, there had been another strike. And I 
have the transcript where Judge Hall complained to the lawyer for the Logan Operators 
Association, Joe Bob Goodman-who's now a federal judge in Huntington-about the coal 
companies conducting labor relations in his court. Explicitly said he was tired of the 
companies coming in for their morning order. And he was just going to start bucking on 
it. And then, then the Buffalo Creek strike started and there was an injunction, and of 
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course, they didn't go back. And there was a dispute about whether .. 
LAE: You mean the miners didn't .. . 
JT: The miners didn't go back to Buffalo Creek. There was an injunction and they 
defied the injunction. They said there's pickets, there were pickets from other mines. 
And they were afraid, they were afraid of to cross the line. And uh, they were .... 
END SIDE 1 - BEGIN SIDE 2 
LAE: Would you please repeat the last sentence that we lost on the tape? 
JT: Yes, we were in court before K.K. Hall on the motion that Pittston Coal Company for 
a rule to show cause why that local should not be found in contempt of Judge Hall's 
temporary restraining order and injunction. And there was a dispute about whether or 
not the local union and the district union had, you know, gathered full efforts to get the 
people back to work. And there was a dispute about what Sim Howze had said or had 
not said. So, they, they put Vernon Cornett was the superintendent, they put him on 
the stand. And I cross-examined him and tried to minimize his testimony. But he said, 
"Sim, Sim had said the men aren't going back to work. And I won't make them go 
back," words to that effect. And then, they put Sim Howze on the stand. And he's, he 
was very intelligent and he answered the questions very intelligently, then he was 
basically run in circles around Joe Bob Goodwin. But then Judge Hall started, and 
Judge Hall being Judge Hall, came right to the point and said, "Did you tell your men to 
cross the picket line? That's what you should have done." And he said, "No, we don't 
do that. I, I will never tell my men to cross the picket. You know ... that would not .. .. " 
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he says, "I have to be honest with the court," he says, "I will not cross picket lines and I 
will not tell my local members to cross the picket line." And Judge Hall said, "Well, you 
couldn't, Mr. Howze, you could not be in more contempt of my order." [DG chuckles] 
And then he asked, "Are you going to go back and tell your people to cross the picket 
lines?" He said, "No, I won't." So, at that point, he put him in-, they called the marshals 
in and took him up to the holding cell and took him down to the Cabell County jail down 
in Huntington. 
LAE: Why did they put him in jail in Huntington, if the court was in Charleston? 
JT: I think they wanted to isolate him, make it hard for him to be a focal point of activity, 
coal miners. But it didn't work because I mean, within one shift, all of Logan, all this 
side of Logan County and so forth, was out. I mean, everybody knew about it. It was in 
the newspapers. People knew about it. And they just started picketing, roving pickets 
then. Everything was out, one shift down there. And in 24 hours, every mine. Every 
mine in District 17. And I can't remember whether District 29 was. But they were all 
out, all of them. And they stayed out for I think, 13 days or something. 
LAE: What is a roving picket? 
JT: Well, it's the sort of thing David was describing where people get organized, they're 
highly organized. And, and uh, go for-, they know where the 
are, they know where the hollows are, and the mines are, and they just-, they know. 
And they go and say, "Sorry, buddy, there's no work here today." Sim Howze is in jail 
and you know ... nobody works. 
LAE: So how long was Sim Howze in jail? 
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JT: I can't remember whether it was 10 days or 13 days, I just can't remember. But 
eventually, there was some-, we worked out some sort of a face-saving arrangement. 
can't remember the details. I do remember that Jim Haviland, who was the 
international union lawyer, and I, as the District 17 lawyer, were called to a secret, 
confidential meeting that Arch Moore, the governor of the State of West Virginia. They 
took us, it was on a Saturday, I think, or Saturday afternoon, or Sunday. There was 
nobody around the state capitol. And they took us ... at that time, under the-, the big 
stairs leading from Kanawha Blvd . up to the rotunda and the door to the state capitol. If 
you go around the bottom, there's a driveway. And at that time, there was an obscure 
little door there underneath those stairs. And if you went through that, there was an 
elaborate office in there. And that's where we met Arch Moore. He was talking in his 
usual bullshit way, trying to figure out how we-, what the union could do to get the 
people back to work because they'd been out for a week, and everything was shut 
down. In fact, he gave me, he gave us both cuff links, gold cuff links and tie clips. I 
kept them for years, but I finally got rid of them. But you know, we told him there's 
nothing we could do. What can we do? 
LAE: It's my understanding that there was a large demonstration on behalf of Sim. 
JT: I understand that. I have, I don't specifically recall. I understand that within the city 
of Charleston there was, the miner's marched. You know, I can't remember who led it 
or how it happened. But there was a lot of miners in the streets of Charleston. And I, I 
understand, I heard that the city of Charleston ordered the fire fighters to come out and 
turn the hoses on these people and the fire fighters wouldn't do it. 
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LAE: Do you know, do you remember .... 
DG: Yeah, I marched with actually with Joshua, my son, in that thing. He was on my 
back. Because he was three, I think, somewhere around three. And I think there were 
about 400-, 400 miners there. I mean, that's my remembrance of this thing. And uh, 
that it was not, there was no permit. It was just a march down the street. They was-, 
they weren't stopped. 
LAE: Which street? 
DG: Oh ... [JT's reply inaudible] Yeah, may be. 
LAE: Go ahead. 
JT: I remember now. It was, it was uh, down, I think they came down Virginia Street 
and then turned up Capitol Street. .. ! think. Because we were told not to go anywhere 
near it. But we had an intern, a legal intern that year, Amy Totenberg, who's sister, 
Nina, is now legal affairs correspondent for National Public Radio. I don't know what 
happened to Amy. But I had a lot of experience with stuff in the Vietnam protest 
marches. And I told her how we used to put various phone numbers on our hands, you 
know, for legal support and to carry lots of dimes, so you could make calls. Which she-, 
they'd never had-, they had no experience whatsoever in these kinds of things. They 
didn't know how to do legal defense. In Detroit, we would even have writs and habeas 
corpus all written, just fill in the blanks, run it to court, bail people out, you know. They 
weren't-, we weren't ready to do that at that time. (LAE: But as .. . ) I remember that 
now. We were told to stay away. 
DG: There were, during 1976 and part of 1975, there were a series of strikes that were 
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much more than local mine strikes. (LA: Excuse me, I need to ... ) [tape off/on] There 
were a lot of things that were going on . One is that there were, I mean, the anti-
injunction strike came at the end of a whole series of injunctions and temporary 
restraining orders (JT: Yeah, yeah). And so, there were a number of strikes, some of 
which were led by the Right-To-Strike committee. And that were, that involved shutting 
down a lots, a bunch of mines. I'm not sure of the exact numbers. I remember two or 
three different times when uh, miners and the Right-To-Strike committee and Right-To-
Strike committee was made up of some politically active miners who were sort of leftist 
miners. But also, a whole number of people who just joined force because they were 
outraged at the injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Every time miners would 
try and strike over something, a restraining order would come out so they couldn't 
strike. And, and so this stuff was building . And so there were, there were several fairly 
big strikes. And I remember in uh, not as big as the anti-injunction strike. But, but I 
remember one in Local 750, which is where I was, which was Arnold Miller's old local, 
where people handled out leaflets, to try and get people .. .. It was more, more 
information about the coal companies and all this stuff, and this political literature. But it 
was uh, the local was divided about it, because it was ahead of time. It was sort of like 
they were giving out leaflets. It wasn 't really pickets showing up. It was somebody 
handing out leaflets saying here's what the coal companies are doing, you know, we 
need to stop this. Next Tuesday we're gonna do this. So, there was enough time for 
the conservative section of the local to get in business, get active and start to say, "We 
don't want these people coming here and shutting down our mines." You know, "we're 
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good workers, we work all the time." And there was this dynamic that went on. And I 
uh, I know that one of the things that the roving pickets did that uh, couldn't be 
responded to as well, was they showed up and had a picket line. And it was done. And 
then the mine was gonna close down. If you, if you tried to get a local to strike ahead of 
time, you allow the opposition to start to organize. And that happens some. You 
know? But there were some big strikes and big rallies. I remember one at Drawdy 
Falls, that I went to, where there was several speakers, something like the Right-
To-Strike committee and some who, who were bringing up their own safety violations in 
the mines. But there were hundreds and hundreds of miners there. Not just a few (JT: 
Yeah). And the leadership wasn't very clear and very good about all that stuff. But it 
was, it was sort of a pre-practice almost. So when Buffalo went out, you know, people 
were ... a lot of people were really ready for something. 
JT: Let me, let me raise another point about Drawdy Falls. That was a popular place, 
because, because it was like, it was on Route 10, and it wasn't too far from the 
Kanawha County border, just inside Boone County, central place for Kanawha and 
Boone County. And it was like an amphitheater. 
The stream, the Raleigh Creek came around like in a half circle. And the park was in 
that half circle, and the ground would rise. So somebody would get up like on a little hill 
and speak out and there was like cliffs and so forth , a rock cliff back up against the 
stream. So it was like a natural amphitheater. And they would meet there. 
DG: And they had something else. Just (JT: Everybody knew about it) in terms of 
democracy and participation, even though those things were not well led and were led 
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to the point of falling down, uh, they were, people participated in all kinds of ways. I 
mean, they would be like I said, there would be hundreds of miners come from as far as 
Mingo, Mercer, Logan, other districts, you know, sometimes would come up to 
Drawdy, certainly Kanawha County, Boone County. And they'd come there, they'd hear 
some speakers, they cheered, sometimes they'd walk away, sometimes they'd get up 
and start to yell from the audience, that it was really involved. And it was a good thing . 
LAE: I want to go back to the point you made about the conservative sector of the 
miners. (DG: Yes) Because up to this point, it looks like everybody is all united. (DG: 
Yeah) And could you maybe identify what you think were the points of difference 
between miners? I mean, it seems to me like safety, everybody would be agreed on it. 
So, how was it the conservative proposed the issue to keep people from striking, or 
how would they make their arguments? 
DG: Well, there were, there were different people who bought into the stuff about the 
coal companies being their friends, you know. When I first went to work in the mines, 
and I, you know, you have to use dust collectors you're supposed to wear to uh, 
indicate whether or not there's dust in the air you worked, see if you were gonna get 
black lung and die from it. So, when I went to work in the mines, Bethlehem was 
supposed to be this company that's your buddy, right? And so the foreman came over 
to me and say, "Well, you know, these dust collectors, you're supposed to wear 'em 
everywhere," he said. But most of the guys here, we just leave them in the dinner hall. 
The dinner hall is like this very dry, dusty place sometimes. And so, you don't-, you're 
not in the face of the mine collecting dust. So there were miners who bought into that, 
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at a certain level. There were miners who were sometimes more rewarded by the 
company, you know, they got a little better position, they got a little extra work, even 
though this stuff is supposed to be regulated by contract. There were people who 
were-, who said, "Well, the company's a lot better than they used to be," or, "This 
company's been good to me." You know, "This company's taken care of me. I've been 
here a long time." And so, you get these differences. Some of the young people, they 
used to call them, what did they call them? Red, they'd say, you know, these guys 
were not red in the communist sense, but red in the sense of being ready to fight, you 
know, ready to get kicked on. And so, you have these inside of the locals, you know, 
you have these conflicts between these workers who were-, who bought into this stuff. 
Even bought into the stuff about why we strike. They-, you know, the company 
propaganda that said, "Ah, they just go out every time it's deer hunting season or every 
time somebody coughs, they have a strike," you know .... every time somebody coughs 
they have a strike, you know, or whatever the excuse. When it rains, they don't want to 
work in the rain, you know, they don't want to go to work in the rain, so they strike. And 
that's nonsense. But, but there were, there were miners who accepted that at a certain 
level. Sometimes they were active in the union leadership positions, you know. It 
depended. But they bought into this stuff. And so, they'd be, and in 750 where I 
worked, they were arguing very strongly against striking, under any conditions. 
Leadership of that local. 
LAE: Uh, I'm curious as to how the leadership of the union responded, you know, as 
obviously the more militant or more radical miners were taking matters into their own 
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hands. What was the response of the union? 
JT: The District 17 leadership was not against any strikes. I was hired explicitly to 
defend strikes. And they would give, as they used to say, a wink and a nod, about 
going back to work. But they were not against the strikes. I can-, this was a District 17 
leadership that came in, was Arnold Miller and the reformed platform, you know ..... 
LAE: Was this an official position or ..... ? 
JT: Oh, no, legally you couldn't do that, because you would expose the union to all 
kinds of liability. We were under a legal duty to try to get the miners back to work. And 
we had to play this game. But unofficially, everybody knew what the deal was. And it 
wasn't only the official-, the top five officers in the district, it was all the uh, the field 
reps, by and large, were also in that reform. The only, the only field rep I can remember 
that was against the union, is now president of the district, is Bob Phalen. But Bob had 
been a Tony Boyle supporter. Yeah, Bob was a Tony man. So, you know, he basically 
took the conservative side. But all the rest of them, Bill Keys, and all of them, they were 
not against these strikes, no. 
LAE: Okay. All right. So we, we are building up here. We have gone through a sort of 
dramatic scene here, in terms of the Buffalo Creek uh, demonstration of support for Sim 
Howze. We're discussing the continued striking. At some point, all these sort of 
connected, but isolated flair-ups, became what I call the great anti-injunction strike. (JT: 
Okay, all right) So, what tipped it over into that? 
JT: Let, let me deal with that first, from my perception of it as a lawyer. Because I 
mean, sort of fast-frame forward to 1975 and the first part of 1976, and they're still out 
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there striking. So, in June of '76, there was a strike in Kanawha County at the Cedar 
Coal Company mines, Local 1766 and 1759. And I, I think somebody was fired. I can't 
remember the exact..... But those were sister locals. They were up there in Kanawha 
County near Cheylan on Slaughter's Creek and on Cabin Creek. There was a strip and 
there was a deep mine. You had, you know, they struck and then there was an 
injunction. And there was a meeting that I went to over at the uh, Marmet Women's 
Club--that's where these locals met--the Marmet Women's Club. And uh, in fact, 
Garnett Pritt, Charlotte Pritt's father, was president of one of those locals. And David 
Forms was the president of the other local. And uh, it was the usual scenario. The 
company, Cedar Coal Company, I should say was a subsidiary of America Electric 
Power. Uh, that's a whole other story. But anyway, they ran to Judge Knapp and got 
their injunction. Then they came in on the Rule-to-Show cause. 
LAE: Could you explain what that is? 
JT: You have to show cause why you're not in contempt. That's what put Sim Howze 
in jail, that he was in contempt of an order. They had showed cause why they were in 
contempt. So, you got both, we're in the big, main courtroom in the district court. 
Judge Knapp is out there. And Judge-, and I should say also, Judge Knapp would 
harangue the miners and he would call them cowards for not crossing the picket line, 
you know. And I remember one local, he compared them to chicken thieves. You 
know ... he was just top stuff to the miners for striking. He thought it was wrong. Later 
on, one of his court reporters, Betty Bradley, told me privately, said, "I told him not to 
talk that way to these people." But anyway, here we are in court, it was a large 
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courtroom, jammed with people. Because you not only have the two locals, these two 
Cedar Coal locals. There was a big local I think from Youngstown Steel, or some place. 
Maybe in McDowell County somewhere a big local. So the whole courtroom, they went 
on to say they were striking, District 29. And the courtroom was full. And, and they, 
and Judge Knapp ... l tried to say, I said, "Judge, we would just like to tell the miner's 
side of the story." I'll never forget this. He said, "There isn't any side to this story. 
There's an injunction." And then David Form's's got up, he was hot. And he said, 
"Judge, all my life I've been told that there'd be justice in the courts, and here, this sort 
of thing." He was very idealistic. And Judge Knapp said, "You better be quiet, or I'm 
gonna put you in jail." And so, and then they imposed a $50,000 per day fine on those 
locals. Understand that District 29 locals were-, that local was there. They're listening 
to all this stuff. Their lawyer was Darrell McGraw. Darrell could make a speech. And 
he, you know, the judge walked out and Darrell made one of his speeches. And they ... 
LAE: Can you remember anything .... ? 
JT: I can't remember exactly. You know how Darrell McGraw talks. And, and uh, I felt 
so downhearted. I was walking down Quarrier Street toward the office. And my head 
was down, and a car full of these miners came by, said, "Don't get your head down, you 
did good. You did good," he said, "we'll take care of it." And they, they had what was 
called a salt pile meeting up at uh, Cheylan. At that time there was a state road facility 
there where they stored salt. And they had a big pile of salt. And they would meet 
there and have what they called salt pile meetings, where somebody would get up on 
the salt pile and talk. And they organized the strike, with both districts, you know. And 
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it was highly organized . 
LAE: Did they organize it as a national strike? Do you know? 
JT: No, no, I don't-, I don't, you know, I don't know. That's what happened. But I don't 
know. All I know is that suddenly there was this-, everybody was out. And I frankly 
didn't blame them. 
LAE: When you say everybody, who do you mean? 
JT: Well, every mine in District 29 and District 17 within like a day or two. And then 
they spread north and they took District 6 and District 31 and eventually, they shut 
down every mine east of the Mississippi. Down in Alabama, Virginia, Kentucky .. .. 
LAE: Did they not shut down the western mines? 
JT: I think some of them did, but I can't remember exactly. 
LAE: Uh, can I go back ..... 
JT: It was explicitly against the injunctions. I mean, everybody, they were just 
outraged by what Judge Knapp had done and how they coal company had gotten this 
injunction. 
LAE: I want to backtrack because people will be using this transcript, or listening to this 
tape that are not familiar with things. Would you identify Darrell McGraw for us? 
JT: Darrell McGraw was a populist lawyer from uh, Wyoming County. Down around 
Mullins, Pineville, and those places. And he became, I mean, he could really make a 
speech. And he ran for the Supreme Court of West Virginia and won, took office in-, 
not long afterwards, about '76 or '78, something like that. But you know, it was an 
activist court. And the whole Supreme court changed . And then, he served, I think one 
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or two terms, and then was defeated and is now the Attorney General for the state of 
West Virginia, serving his second term. 
LAE: For those using the transcript or tape, there is an interview in the collection of 
Darrell McGraw. As a matter of fact, it was done this summer, and I do not know if they 
touched on this. Okay, so, the great anti-injunction strike took off. David, would you 
share your perceptions of, of this sort of same period of time? 
DG: I'm trying to think and remember. [chuckles] I remember the strike. I don't 
remember about what happened in relationship to out west. I know that mines shut 
down fairly rapidly. There were roving pickets, uh [pausing for thought] ... (LAE: Go 
ahead) ... 
JT: I know from conversations with some miners that took part in this, they had, it was 
highly organized. They used CB radios, and, and they divided the whole-, everything 
up into areas, it was like a military campaign. And they had, you know, people who 
were in charge at various squads, who had responsibility for specific geographies 
areas. And they communicated by CB's. And they were very effective in it. And I 
remember. One poignant story I remember .... we had a local president down in Boone 
County, his name was Kenneth Lovejoy. And this, this very sincere man, he believed in 
the contract and that they should strike. And he was humpback. Emmett was 
humpbacked because he had spent all of life shoveling coal along the ribbon in a 
hunched over position. And, and the, the uh, the phrase that the miners used to 
describe people who were trying to beat the picket line, became a lovejoy. They would 
say on the CB, "There's a lovejoy over at such and such place," like a code, right? 
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They stopped people like Emmett who were trying to get to work. I felt so sorry for him, 
because he was trying-, he was such an honest man. He was trying to do what he 
could, and he was hauled into court, his local was in contempt and he was just tore up. 
I remember, we walked out of Judge-, he told Judge Knapp he was doing his best. And 
I felt so sorry for him. I put my arm around him .... 
LAE: Was he an official? 
JT: Yeah, he was a local president. I put my arm around him as we walked out, 
because he was just so tore up. 
LAE: So, what you're saying is that a lot of people were conflicted. 
JT: I don't know about a lot, but there was some. 
LAE: Did-, was he aware that he had become a, a .... 
JT: No, that was part of the poignancy of it. He didn't know. I knew that the term 
"lovejoy", his name had become an epithet. He didn't know that. He was just so, he 
was ..... 
DG: There were two things that I was thinking about while John was talking . One is, 
that there was one of the agreements against striking at this point. Even though this 
was really well-organized against wildcats, against continued striking, was loss of 
wages, that people were talking about how many days they've lost wages from strikes 
in the past years. And so there was a kind of force working here. And, and also, that 
the other thing I was thinking, was that once a mine would shut down, there didn't need 
to be pickets at it. But people showed up at rallies or at meetings, to find out what was 
the latest. But they didn't, you didn't need pickets. The mines were shut down, people 
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didn't go to work. And even those people who were conservative, wouldn't try to go to 
work. You know, who were, who were not supportive. They-, so that it was pretty tight 
and it was, it sort of was almost mysteriously tight like that. 
LAE: Yes? [speaking to John Taylor] 
JT: Arnold Miller became paranoid about me in this period, and he thought that I was 
the leader of it. Which I've always thought was very contemptuous of the membership, 
that a lawyer would lead this miners. Miller got that idea because my practice from day 
one was I would call, I would get calls in where who was on strike and where. And if 
the districts didn't-, sub-districts didn't call, I would call them. Because I needed to 
know who was striking and where and over what. And in Arnold Miller's mind, it 
became that the lawyer was the nerve center, you know, directing all these pickets. 
And, and at that-, there was a 
became a lot of anger at Arnold Miller at this point. For just generally .... 
LAE: Can we clarify that the pickets were striking in opposition to the official position to 
the union, as well as against the company? 
JT: Well, yeah, because Arnold Miller and the lawyers over at headquarters said, 
"We've got to take the position that we're against this." 
LAE: And they were truly against it? As opposed to District 17? 
JT: I believe so, as I recall. (LAE But the .... ) There was a lot of tension between the 
District 17 leadership and Arnold Miller. I mean, they had been stronger supporters of 
him, and they had been disillusioned by the weakness of his administration. It was just 
weak. And they didn't like the fact that the lawyers were running the union, which was 
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basically what was happening. And .... 
LAE: They didn't like the fact that the lawyers in Washington (JT: In Washington). Who 
were those lawyers? 
JT: Oh, Rick Bank, Tom, I don't know if Tom Geohagen was there, 
DG: 
JT: Joe [inaudible]. ... wasn't with them at that point. Harrison Combs, who became 
general counsel. A lot of conservative. 
Jock Jablonski, Jock was-, I don't remember if Jablonski was on staff then at that time. 
Rich Trumka was on staff then. I can't remember the names of all these people. I 
remember they put Jim Haviland in a very bad position, because he was getting a lot of 
pressure from the legal staff in Washington to do something. Because they felt like the 
international was going to be exposed to a lot of liability. 
LAE: So essentially this, this injunction strike then was against the, union-, the 
international companies and the federal judiciary? 
JT: I would say that's a fair way to say it. Arnold Miller came to town several times. 
But he was so frightened of the members. That's what I remember, he was frightened 
of the membership, that he came to the District 17 headquarters, but he didn't do it 
publicly. There was, people didn't know this, but up on the 3rd floor of the 
headquarters, just several little offices up there. You wouldn't know they were there 
unless you, you know, knew the building. He would go to the 3rd floor and stay there. 
And then, nights he would go to the Heart-of-Town. He wouldn't even go up Cabin 
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Creek where he lived--he'd stay at the Heart-of-Town motel. 
LAE: Who did he meet with when he came to town? Do you know? 
JT: I don't know. He had-, by that time, he had surrounded himself with flunkies, you 
know. And, and uh, he had bodyguards. He would call them international 
representatives. But they were bodyguards. But uh, yeah, [inaudible] ..... 
And they would tell him what he wanted to hear. It was a sad situation. 
LAE: You've talked about the issue of lost wages, and the, the strike is now continuing. 
And the company is saying certain things to the press. If you could sort of think about 
the local communities and people you knew at that time, would you say that essentially 
families and communities ..... 
END OF SIDE 2 - TAPE 1 
BEGIN SIDE 1 - TAPE 2 
LAE: Okay. 
DG: During 1975 I worked for Bethlehem Steel. And after that, I worked some with 
UMW District 17, and with West Virginia Tech, doing classes and trying to arrange for-, 
setup education and education program with miners, partly, partly because of what had 
happened. Okay, during-, I think during a large part of the strike, and strikes that was 
going on, there was a lot of community support for the miners. But I, I think it's 
important to know that there was a war going on, not just the miners striking. But a war 
of ideas about whether striking was a legitimate thing to do. Even though there was 
long history. But there was a lot, a lot of campaigning going by the coal companies, 
and also by the state of West Virginia by the courts that was the part that was being 
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publicized, that miners were being reckless, that they were violent, that they were not 
under anybody's control, the union was out of control, that uh, they were not, you know, 
that these were young red necks who were just striking at the drop of a hat. And lots of 
stuff. And without much on the other side, other than the miners' solidarity, there was 
some local support for this stuff that was happening in the communities. I mean, I 
know, I know very personally that miners wives were saying to them, "When is this 
going to end?" And some were supporting the strike very clearly, and organizing, by 
the way, organizing support. But uh, but some people were being-, were saying, 
"Where's the next check coming from? What's gonna go on?" All this kind-, all this 
kind of questions were being pushed hard and uh, and I don't think the union did much 
for the striking miners, did very much to educate or to inform people enough about .... 
And they weren't necessarily organized for that. Either-, I don't know if there was an 
awareness of what was needed, besides staying out till Hell freezes over, which nobody 
could really do anyway, you know. So, I think that, that's just an important piece, 
because people were, there was a fight over ideas. And this question of the whole 
question of whether the miners could strike legally or illegally and get away with it. And 
what was going on was this sort of restriction of the miners rights. The miners ability to 
do-, use that tool to get, you know, protect themselves. 
LAE: Okay, in terms of telling the story, there's a point about, it wasn't clear that Sim 
Howze ever got out of jail. Could you just sort of .... ? 
JT: Yeah, I can't remember the exact details of it. But there was an arrangement or 
settlement around that, between Sim and the union, and the coal company and Judge 
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Knapp, that [inaudible] ... he decided to save face. He got out of jail. There was some 
fines against the local, and they worked it out that the company forgave the fines. They 
just, they tried to just smooth it over, forget about it. But of course, strikes continued 
unabated. And [inaudible] ... . up into 1976. You want me to speak now about how that 
went into .... ? 
LAE: Well, or it.. .. we're sort of in the middle of it. And it spread. I mean, we got to the 
point where it's-, all the mines closed east of the Mississippi, and perhaps some of the 
western ones. And what is the reaction of the courts and what is the reaction of the 
companies. You've spoken of the reaction of the international union. So what are the 
reactions of the other sides? That you can remember, a day that you could speak to 
us, as well? 
JT: Well, 1-, it's just a blur to me, because I was in court almost constantly. I mean, I 
could speak to the legal maneuvering that went on in various supreme court 
LAE: [inaudible] .. .. 
JT: Okay, well, I had mentioned earlier that the injunction labor law came from the 
Boys market case, where you could not strike over arbitratable disputes. And then, uh, 
there had been a case where Armco came to court down here, in the southern district, 
and Judge, over the questions of pickets, and whether that was Arbitratable. And 
Judge Knapp had said that it wasn't arbitratable. Judge Knapp was a fair man. And he 
came from Madison, Boone County. He'd worked underground. And then Armco took 
him down to the court circuit on appeal--this is a whole other strike we're talking about--
and they reversed-, that said Judge Knapp was wrong . And then, at about the same 
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time the strike was going on, the US Supreme Court came out with a decision against, 
involving Buffalo Forge Company, and the machinists, I think. There was a court up in 
New York in the 3rd Circuit, and that court said that pickets were not [inaudible]. You 
could not get an injunction if there were pickets. And we're all saying, "Yes." And I felt 
so cocky. I remember I was in court with the company lawyers. And I had said, "By 
God, let's find out what this Buffalo Forge means." So, we're in front of Judge-, I can't 
remember which judge it was. And 1-, they mouse trapped me very neatly. Because I 
was so aggressive. And I said, "Let's, let's calm down." So, we're on a hearing on a 
temporary restraining order, not an injunction . We hadn't taken any testimony, no 
testimony. And, or minimal testimony. And the judge says, "You want more testimony 
and you want more time, Mr. Taylor?" And I said, "No." I'm relying on Buffalo Forge. 
So, you know, he-, then the judge, I can't remember what judge it was, but he ruled 
against us and says it was injunctionable. I can't remember.... Anyway, the next thing 
we know, we're down in the [inaudible] ... circuit in Abington, Virginia, in front this awful 
judge, Judge Widner, who's very anti-miner, this old boy. And we're-, Jim Haviland and 
I are down talking to this man and trying , trying ... . He's very hostile and he's trying-, 
you know, we're trying to placate this man, and talk about Buffalo Forge and he didn't 
want to hear about Buffalo Forge, you know. And, and uh, it was just a disaster legally. 
It was one of the worst mistakes I ever made as a lawyer, to be so aggressive. We, we 
were, we had nothing to say. There was no testimony from the locals about what, you 
know, what were the underlying causes of the dispute. So, that, I was going back and 
forth all the time to the court. Not only on the local aspects, because every coal 
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company in southern West Virginia came in to court to get their injunction, you know, to 
get their morning orders on, on this particular strike. So I was in court all the time. 
Then running down to the 4th circuit, Adington, Virginia. It's just a blur to me now. 
LAE: Could you talk a little bit about visiting the locals, and talking with them, and some 
of the incidents that occurred then? 
JT: Oh ... well, one, one of the things that I had to do as, when they would strike, not just 
on this one, but on all of them, all the strikes, I would have to go out to the locals and 
find out, either talk to the mine committee, or go to a local meeting, and find out what 
was going on. Because the court would want to say, "What's going on, Mr. Taylor? 
Why are they doing this?" That period of time I devised what was known-, what I called 
the hands-up defense, where the judge would say, "What's going on, Mr. Taylor?" and I 
would hold up my hands and say, "I don't know, Judge." [chuckles] Or if I did know, 
and it was favorable, I would say, you know.... But I remember explicitly in the Buffalo 
Creek uh, strike, the Sim Howze strike, I was, I went down to a local meeting late at-, at 
night, at Lundale, Lundale Grade School. And almost all the Buffalo Creek locals was 
there. The gymnasium was packed. And I, when I went down there, Judge Hall knew 
that I was going. And he said, "Would you tell them, tell them Judge Hall said to get 
back to work." So I went down there and there was all this crowd and I said, "I've got to 
tell you this message. This is a message from Judge Hall," that's what I said. And, and 
uh, I said, "Judge Hall wants you all to obey his injunction and go back to work." There 
was just like an explosion of sound, you know, that basically he should come down and 
tell us his own self, if he wants us to go back to work. "Get that judge down here," they 
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said. And, I, I've really-, it's such a blur. The only meetings in the injunction strike that 
I, in '76 that I remember, the ones over at the Marmet Women's Club, they would 
always be packed, and they always agreed that they should keep the strike going, keep 
going. Because there was big fines, you know, against the local, $50,000 a day or 
some damn thing, I can't remember. 
LAE: Well, talk a little bit about those fines. I mean, once the whole thing was closed 
down, was every local being fined? 
JT: Every local was under threat of being fined, and so was the district and so was the 
international. So, we had to placate the court system, that the various levels of the 
union were either, either trying hard-, damndest to get 'em back to work, or it was such 
a difficult situation that it would be humanly impossible to get them back to work. 
LAE: But fines were levied? 
JT: Fines were levied . The court-, coal companies had a, like a formula for damages 
on the strikes. They would come out and they would .... wouldn't stand up under cross-
examination, but they would bring an accountant and they'd have a calculation of how 
many tons of coal they were losing per shift. What that cost. They would have all the 
cost, the, the uh, fixed cost of running the mines: electricity, you know, all the things 
that had to go into the, pay maintenance crews, you know, having supervisors work and 
try to maintain the mines and keep it in working order. And they had this whole format 
when we cross-examined these, these accountants, we'd ask questions that they 
couldn't answer, but it didn't really matter. The judge was going to issue a fine. He's 
going to issue an order saying, "You were fined such and such an amount of money. 
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And then, usually what would happen, they would go back to work. And everything 
would be sort of forgotten in the interest of peace. 
LAE: Okay, that's in the period leading up to the great-, great injunction? 
JT: Oh, and afterwards, too. But all these locals were subject to fines. 
LAE: Okay. But during this-, what's the exact time period of the great anti-injunction 
strikes? 
JT: It started, it started just before the annual vacation period in either June or July 
1976. And they went off on-, it was started. And then they went off on vacation and 
people'd say, "Well, maybe after vacation, they'll get it out of their system, they'll come 
back from vacation. No, it didn't work, they took their vacations and then came back 
and struck, continuing..... So it's just June and July of 1976. I can't remember the 
exact dates. 
LAE: Did it not start again in 1977? 
JT: Well, that's part of this whole process that we talked about. In 1977, there was a 
wide-spread strike over the decision of the international union and the health and 
welfare fund, pension fund, to no longer .... in fact, it was in the contract, maybe. I can't 
remember, no, it wasn't in the contract. They made a unilateral decision in Washington 
that there no longer would be what was known as the 85 HS health card, which every 
miner had. Which meant that you get benefits from the Health & Welfare fund. Instead, 
they allowed some companies to hire their own insurance, either Blue Cross or 
Prudential. And people were just outraged at that. And there was a big strike about 
that in the summer of 1977. 
-38-
LAE: Okay, so the were two different issues? (JT: Yes, yeah) Okay. So, in the-, let's 
go back to the 1976 anti-injunction strike. The people that were the most important 
leaders, may or may not have been union officials. Is that true? 
JT: Oh, yeah .... 
LAE: Okay. In other words, if the union president was, as you say, David, a 
conservative, it might have been some of the other people in the local union? 
JT: Yeah, well, by and large, see, in the mines, in these local unions, usually your best 
leadership, would not be in the local leadership, would not be your local president or 
the local officers. It would be on the mine committee, and especially the safety 
committee. Because those were the people that, they were the leaders that were 
respected. Because they were the ones that administered the contract at the mine 
level. And by and large, they were the best people, and they were not local officers, no. 
(LAE: Well, were) .... So that.. .. they were .... 
LAE: They were not local officers? 
JT: No, they weren't like the president, vice-president. 
LAE: Oh, okay. So they were not executive officers? 
JT: No, they were not executive officers. 
LAE: Okay. This group of, let's call it most militant leadership. Would you say they 
were the younger miners or the older miners? Or a mix? 
JT: It was a mix. I can remember a lot of the younger ones. I'm not gonna call their 
names. And I can remember some older ones who were out there doing it, too. 
LAE: At this time when all of this was going on, were there a lot of new people in the 
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mines? 
JT: I believe there were, but I'm not sure. 
DG: There were new people hired .... there was almost a sort of wave of hiring in early 
'75, and late, or early '75. And uh, I think these were in, from some of what I saw was, 
there was a mixture of miners, older and younger. But there were like some, some 
bands, from Logan County I know there was, there was a couple of [inaudible] .... 
and miners who come traveling around, you know, young guys who were, who couldn't 
understand why everything was going to court. You know, they kept saying, "Why do 
we have to go to court about all these things?" You know, like they'd have a safety 
question or some kind of grievance at a local. And they'd say, "We want this settled 
here and now, (JT: Right). And what they were told was, uh, you couldn't, if you did 
anything about it, you had to deal with that in court. And in order to deal with it, you had 
to go through a legal procedure. The further it was away from the mine, they more they 
said, you know, "This is not going to happen. This is not getting what we want." 
JT: That jogs my memory. They were right. Because in the contract under grievance 
procedures, it says explicitly that both sides agree that they will try to settle disputes 
without recourse to court. Those four words were in there. And people can read 
English. It said, "Without recourse to court". And here's these damn companies 
running to court to get their morning orders. 
LAE: Okay. Can we go back now? We're in the middle of the injunction strike. 
Everything was shut down. Pressure is being brought there. What happens? 
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JT: Well, I'm not sure at what the mechanism of this was. But what I remember was, 
that Jim Haviland and I were called at the union legal offices and told the judge (LAE: In 
Charleston?) in Charleston. We were told, and I can't even remember who made the 
call. But Judge Knapp was willing to back down. And, and he would publically 
apologize. So, what he did was, he set a hearing on contempt for the locals, there was 
two Cedar Coal locals. And he set it on a Saturday morning. So, and .... 
LAE: What was the significance of the Saturday morning? 
JT: Nobody's there. 
LAE: Nobody meaning .... ? 
JT: Press, coal miners. And there was a lot, you know, the New York Times had, you 
know, one of their top reporters, Ben Franklin was down there. I mean, this got a lot of 
national coverage. And he did it sort of secretly. And I, I tried to get people to come 
out and witness it. But I could only get one guy who would come out on a Saturday 
morning. I remember him, Sonny Holstein. Worked for Amer-, worked for Cedar Coal, 
lived down in South Charleston. And I said, I knew him, and I said, "You come out and, 
you know, witness this." And then there was a reporter from the Charleston Gazette 
was there. So it was just a couple of us. And Judge Knapp came out and apologized . 
And, and, and (LAE: So .... ) and canceled the fines. (LAE: So .. .. ) And there was such-, 
at some point, there was, you know, they would go back to work .... if he would 
apologize. 
LAE: So David Forms was not there? (JT: No) So, the people that he had degraded 
were not present at the time of the apology? 
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JT: No, no, no. Frankly, I don't think they would have given it the dignity of showing up 
anyway, frankly; I don't know. The miners .... I remember I talked to Howard Greene, 
and he .. .. (LAE: Who was Howard?) Howard Greene was at that point, a field 
representative over in uh, Boone County field. But he was very strong politically, and 
later became sub-district 2 executive board member in charge of (DG: He was head of 
District 17) no, he never-, no, he became an international board member for District 17. 
But he was very politically influential. And he was-, I can't remember how active that 
Howard was in all the strike-, all the picketing or not. I just can't remember. But, you 
know, Howard said, "Just get Sonny Holstein and that'll be all right." And I told him, I 
said, "Howard, I really want the people [inaudible] .... And so .... 
LAE: How were the men told? 
JT: They were just-, I don't know again, I don't know the mechanism. I remember that 
there were all kinds of radio announcements all through the coal fields, from the union 
and everybody, that they should all go back to work. And they did. 
LAE: Did it say that the judge had apologized? 
JT: Can't remember. 
LAE: Do you remember, David? 
DG: I don't remember that. 
JT: Somebody should get the newspapers and stuff, in that period of time, and ..... 
DG: I seriously doubt it, but I can't remember 
LAE: [inaudible] ... 
JT: I wasn't thinking fast enough.. I should have had, ordered a transcript of that, of 
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what he said. 
LAE: Now, this is the kind of-, someone using the transcript can do research, so ..... 
But, I'm confused, because the union was telling the people to go back to work anyway. 
I mean, that was part of their initial duties. So what would make this radio 
announcement different than others? 
JT: It was a radio announcement. The other times they would-, he would tell them to 
go back to work, but you do it in a local meeting. So that you could say, "Boys, you 
have to go back to work," you know what I'm saying? (LAE: Mmm-hmm) Or they would 
say, "Boys, you gotta go back to work," and they, the miners would go out, after the 
meeting, go out somewhere and say, "I'm not, uh-huh, we aren't gonna listen to an old 
man. We're gonna keep striking." 
DG: But John, I don't remember this. Was, was it the impression that they got what 
they were out for? 
JT: I believe it was. But how that impression was conveyed I don't know. (DG: Yeah, 
yeah) You'd have to ask some of the guys who were, you know, if you could find David 
Forms, or talk to Garnett or somebody, you know, find out how that happened. 
LAE: Okay. 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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